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ABSTRACT 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND DEMOGRAPHIC CAUSES 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF LOW FERTILITY  
Thomas Markley Anderson 
Hans-Peter Kohler 
The demographic phenomenon of “low fertility” has received considerable 
attention over the last three decades within academic, political, and public spheres.   
While a large body of research has led to a deeper understanding of the underlying social 
and economic dimensions of low fertility, current theoretical and empirical approaches 
fail to explain puzzles pertaining to within and across population heterogeneity in fertility 
rates.  This dissertation is comprised of three papers that investigate the social, economic, 
and demographic causes and consequences of low fertility. Chapter 1 sets forth a new 
theoretical approach to examining the interrelations between low fertility, socioeconomic 
development, and gender equity among developed countries.  The main findings of this 
chapter are that 1) the pace and onset of socioeconomic development explain a significant 
proportion of the variation in fertility among developed countries, 2) low fertility may 
facilitate changes in gender norms through a “gender-equity dividend”, and 3) contrary to 
Second Demographic Transition theory, low fertility may be a transitory phase of the 
demographic transition.  Whereas the Chapter 1 looks cross-nationally at gender and 
fertility dynamics, Chapter 2 takes a micro-level approach by exploring the relationship 
between fertility and gender norms in the United States.   Using the National 
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Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY 79), I find that both men and women with 
progressive views on gender equity have lower fertility than their traditional counterparts, 
though these results were stronger, more consistent, and more significant across models 
for women.  In Chapter 3 I argue that the rising costs of childrearing through “shadow 
education” have become a key fertility-reducing force across high, medium, and low-
income countries.  To investigate this hypothesis, I use data from the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) and find evidence of a “quality-quantity 
tradeoff” both within and across populations due to costly shadow education.  
Collectively, the findings of this dissertation signal that the causes and consequences of 
low fertility are multifaceted and evolving across time and space. 
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Preface 
 
August, 2014. 
Within just weeks of each other, during the time of this writing (August 20, 
2014), two very different population projections made newspaper headlines. 
The first was set forth by an assembly of social scientists commissioned by the 
South Korean government, which predicted the country would “go extinct” by 2750.  
Extrapolating demographic trends from the first decade of the 21st century, the 
government created a stir by predicting the peninsular country’s demise.  Although 
criticized for myopically assuming past trends will hold indefinitely, South Korea’s 
government highlighted the demographic consequence of ultra-low fertility in the 
absence of in-migration—population implosion. 
The second projection was featured in a UNICEF report on African population 
growth.  According to the report, the continent will swell up to 1 billion people by 2050 
and house nearly 40% of the world’s children.  UNICEF warns that the “pace of 
population growth could potentially undermine attempts to eradicate poverty and increase 
disparities” if the continent fails to build the immense educational and health 
infrastructure needed to galvanize economic development. 
While the two aforementioned scenarios represent the extreme demographic 
consequences of low and high fertility – one of extinction and the other of overpopulation 
– their juxtaposition illustrates the influential role human fertility plays on the 
maintenance and well-being of society.  In an era where the vast majority of the world’s 
 
 
 
xii 
population no longer practices natural fertility, social scientists focus on social and 
economic factors to understand heterogeneity in fertility levels across and within 
populations.  In the spirit of this ever evolving research endeavor, this dissertation seeks 
to provide a deeper, more nuanced, and clearer understanding of the causes and 
consequences of fertility trends within and across populations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Chapter 1: Demographic Transition Revisited:  Low Fertility, 
Socioeconomic Development, and Gender Equity1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The relationship between human development and fertility has recently received 
considerable attention, with some studies claiming that the established negative 
correlation between fertility and measures of human development, such as HDI, has 
fundamentally changed among the most advanced countries (Myrskylä et al. 2009; 
Harknett et al. 2014; Testa 2014; Luci-Greulich and Thévenon 2014). A limitation of this 
research, however, has been the relatively short-term focus, with analyses focusing on 
development and fertility trends beginning in the last decades of the 20th century. In this 
paper we argue that a more long-term perspective to this question is in order. 
Encompassing a broader time horizon beginning in the early 20th century, this paper 
combines novel empirical evidence with a wide body of social science literature to 
provide new theoretical insights into the interrelations among low fertility, 
socioeconomic development, and gender equity. Specifically, we argue that the onset and 
long-term pace of socioeconomic development are inherently linked with a key driver of 
fertility variation within developed countries: differing gender equity regimes. Moreover, 
we argue that these gender equity regimes are not static, but instead, dynamic and closely 
tied to changes in fertility through a demographic feedback mechanism: a gender-equity 
dividend. This gender-equity dividend is the result of the following process: below-
                                                          
1 This chapter is co-authored by Hans-Peter Kohler (University of Pennsylvania). 
 
 
 
2 
replacement fertility brought about by work-family conflicts yields age-structures at 
young adulthood that are characterized by a relative scarcity of women relative to men 
(given the prevailing gender-differences in the age at marriage), which in turn facilitates 
changes in gender norms and the rise of greater gender equity. Greater gender equity is 
then likely to help raise or stabilize fertility in low-fertility high-income countries. In this 
process, therefore, the emergence of below-replacement fertility implies a homeostatic 
mechanism that over the medium/long-term can contribute to increasing fertility, such as 
has been documented in some advanced countries with high levels of gender equity. We 
argue that this theory also helps explain the fertility pattern in countries such as S. Korea, 
where a rapid decline in fertility during the demographic transition has resulted in very 
low contemporary fertility levels associated with relatively high levels of household 
gender inequity. Moreover, given current age structures at young adult ages, we argue 
that changes in gender norms should be imminent in such contexts, contributing to a 
reversal of the lowest-low fertility patterns. Drawing on these insights, we propose a 
variant of the demographic transition that incorporates an interplay between changes in 
fertility and gender equity.   
1.2 Background 
 
 Most country-level studies on the relationship between socioeconomic 
development and low fertility compare the development and fertility trajectories in high-
income countries after the 2nd half of the 20th century. During this period, most high-
income countries already had near or below replacement fertility. These studies therefore 
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ignore the process through which low fertility initially emerged during the 
demographic transition. We argue that an understanding of the development-fertility 
interrelations requires a distinction based on the pace of development during the fertility 
transition. In first-wave developers, as we will argue below, socioeconomic development 
occurred more gradually during much of the late 19th and 20th century; in second-wave 
developers, in contrast, socioeconomic development was concentrated in the 2nd half of 
the 20th century, and economic growth rates were often significantly faster than those 
experienced by first-wave developers. In both cases, fertility decline was associated with 
the development process. And yet, despite both sets of countries attaining high income 
and generally low fertility levels, contemporary gender norms and levels of gender equity 
differ between first- and second-wave developers. These differences have far-reaching 
implications for current and future fertility trends and family dynamics, helping to 
explain why fertility has stabilized at moderately below-replacement levels in some, 
while dropping to very low and lowest-low fertility level in other countries.  We develop 
this reasoning in more detail below. 
First-Wave Developers: 
The late 19th to early 20th century was an era of profound economic, social, and 
demographic change for countries in Northern and Western Europe, as well as the 
English-speaking countries.2  Because these countries were at the forefront of 
                                                          
2 These include the other English-speaking non-European countries Australia, New Zealand, the US, and 
Canada. 
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industrialization and socioeconomic development, they are referred to hereinafter as 
“first-wave developers” (see Appendix I).  Economic growth spurred a rise in living 
standards, educational and occupational opportunities for men and women flourished, and 
novelties like kitchen appliances and cars became available to a growing share of the 
population. While material change quickly swept across industrializing countries, 
societies found themselves in a flux of old and new ways of thinking.  Traditional norms 
clashed with a new wave of progressive attitudes in several social domains.  Observing 
these “clashes”, Ogburn (1922) theorized that a “maladjustment” period occurs during 
which individuals fail to synchronize behavior and attitudes to new material change.  He 
called this delay between material and behavioral change a “cultural lag.”  Ogburn’s 
emphasis on a cultural lag period is also reflected in the recently proposed theory of 
conjunctural action (TCA) (Johnson-Hank et al. 2011) to explain how fertility/family 
change arise through individual behaviors during periods of material change. In this TCA 
framework, for example, a cultural lag between material and behavioral change emerges 
because social action occurs in conjunctures, that is, short-term and contingent 
configurations of social structure. In such conjunctures, individuals employ familiar 
schemas and materials to make sense of what is happening.  This framework emphasizes 
the importance of existing internalized schemas that act as prisms through which 
individuals make life decisions, such as having children.  Because such schema are 
individually-learned and slow to change, the TCA framework argues that behavioral 
change is most likely to occur in contexts when schemas for different behavioral domains 
start to contradict each other: for example, when schemas regarding an increasing 
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participation of women in the labor force start conflicting with schemas about fertility, 
childrearing, and marriage. Because this conflict between schemas usually unfolds 
gradually over time, changes in schemas and the behaviors regulated by schemas, tend to 
follow changes in the social and institutional contexts with a cultural lag.  
One area in which cultural lag was especially pronounced during the early 20th 
century was with respect to gender norms and women’s roles within the household, the 
economy and society.  For example, technological progress and capital accumulation in 
the early stages of the Industrial Revolution complemented mentally intensive tasks more 
than physically intensive tasks, thereby raising the return to the former relative to the 
latter (Galor and Weil 1996; Galor 2011).  Because women arguably had a comparative 
advantage in mentally intensive tasks requiring less physical strength, the demand for 
women’s labor increased as a result and the gender wage gap narrowed (Galor 2011). In 
similar vein, Goldin (1990) suggests that a greater demand for office and clerical work 
from information technologies propelled a surge in the demand for female labor.  
Moreover, the type of work women engaged in before and during the industrial 
revolution was transformed.  Before industrialization, the economic participation of 
women largely occurred within a familial context (e.g., in agriculture or a family 
business), while during (and after) the industrial revolution, employment increasingly 
involved contractual agreements between employers and the individual (Ruggles 2015). 
The combination of women’s increasing labor force participation and the growing 
prevalence of employer-individual labor contracts strengthened women’s independence. 
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Occupational opportunities for women and female labor force participation 
clearly rose during the industrialization in first-wave developers during the early part of 
the 20th century. However, female labor force participation was often already widespread, 
ranging for example from 20% in the US to nearly 50% in France in 1900 (see Figure 1.1 
below). In addition, there was a substantial extent of female economic activities on 
family farms and in family businesses (Ruggles 2015). Despite these relatively large 
levels of economic participation in the early 20th century, however, traditional male 
breadwinner/female housewife norms prevailed because women’s work often did not 
significantly increase their status or bargaining power, in part because family farms and 
businesses were often patriarchal in nature (Goldin 1990; Ruggles 2015).  As a result, a 
substantial stigma against working wives outside the home existed at the time, leaving 
women with a “clear choice between family and career” (Goldin 2004, p. 23). 
Figure 1.1: Female Labor Force Participation Rates for Select First-Wave 
Developers, 19003 
                               
Source:  Olivetti (2013) 
                                                          
3 For the United States, these rates undercount people working as boardinghouse keepers, unpaid family farm 
workers and manufacturing workers in homes and in factories (Olivetti 2013).  Additionally, Olivetti calls 
for caution when analyzing historical FLFPR, as country-wide differences in the definition of “economically 
active” exist.  The rates presented largely reflect the proportion of the female population (both married and 
unmarried) that “receives a wage”. 
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This observation about work-family conflicts in the early 20th century is 
important because a strong work-family conflict—or, in McDonald’s words “a conflict or 
inconsistency between high levels of gender equity in individual-oriented social 
institutions and sustained gender inequity in family-oriented social institutions” 
(McDonald 2000, p. 427)—contributes importantly to the rise and persistence of very low 
fertility in high-income countries.4  In other words, where traditional norms regarding 
childrearing, household work, and male breadwinner roles prevail while institutional 
gender equity and female labor force participation increases, women are more likely to 
view having a family as being at odds with pursuing career aspirations (hence, “work-
family conflict”), and fertility falls to low levels.  
Figure 1.2 illustrates how differential levels of institutional gender equity and 
household (or “family-oriented”) gender equity lead to varying degrees of the work-
family conflict. The top-left quadrant echoes McDonald’s theory: high levels of both 
institutional and household gender equity concur with higher fertility than equally high 
institutional but lower household gender equity in the bottom-left quadrant.  Expectedly, 
the bottom-right quadrant indicates that low institutional gender equity is associated with 
a weak work-family conflict.  The top-right quadrant is left blank in Figure 1.2, as both 
empirically and theoretically, it is unlikely that men share household tasks evenly in a 
society where women do not (desire to) work outside of the home. The bottom-right 
                                                          
4 McDonald (2013) distinguishes between “gender equity” and “gender equality” by stating that “gender 
equity is about perceptions of fairness and opportunity rather than strict equality of outcome”, and argues 
that the former is more important than the latter concerning fertility decision-making. 
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quadrant may provide insight into the gender dynamics during the mid-century baby 
boom, an aspect on which we elaborate in our concluding discussion. 
Figure 1.2: Female Labor Force Participation and Household Gender Equity Relationship 
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While McDonald’s theory of gender equity and fertility was developed for 
contemporary high-income countries within the post-baby boom context, it is also 
applicable to the social and demographic context of the early 20th century.  In particular, 
several recent studies have argued that one consequence of the work-family conflict 
during the early 20th century was sub-replacement fertility (Van Bavel 2010; Tolnay and 
Guest 1982).5  But this attribution of low fertility during the first part of the 20th century 
to work-family conflict is not necessarily a new insight. Many social scientists of the 
early 20th century, including Edin (1932), Myrdal (1941), Tandler (1927), Charles (1934), 
                                                          
5 Among contemporary demographers, low fertility during the early half of the 20th century in Western 
Europe is frequently attributed as a consequence of economic and political instability during the interbellum 
period (e.g., Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; Sobotka 2008; Frejka and Sardon 2004).  In recent years, however, 
this claim has been empirically refuted.  Van Bavel (2010), for example, argues that low fertility during the 
interwar period was due to processes now associated with the Second Demographic Transition rather than 
economic hardships. In initial disbelief to Van Bavels findings, Goldstein (2012) modestly exclaimed that 
after “torturing the data”, he was not able to find any effect of the great depression on fertility rates, and 
conceded to Van Bavel’s argument. 
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Darwin (1919), von Ungern-Sternberg (1937), and Wieth-Knudsen (1937), all came to 
a similar conclusion and directly discussed the negative associations between fertility and 
female educational attainment/labor market participation, speculating about the causal 
link between the two.6 In Sweden, a country now championed for its family friendly 
environment, both contemporary and current scholars have argued that very low fertility 
was driven partly by female laborers who found it difficult to combine childcare with a 
career (Van Bavel 2010; Edin 1932).  In the United States and Australia, nearly half of 
female university graduates in the early 20th century remained childless, while the other 
half reached fertility levels well below replacement (Cookingham 1984; Mackinnon 
1993; Goldin 2004).  High incidences of childlessness among working women were also 
documented in England and Wales (Kelsall and Mitchell 1959) and Germany (von 
Ungern-Sternberg 1938).  As Van Bavel and Kok (2010) observe:  “for well-educated 
women in the early twentieth century, to become a mother often meant forfeiting a 
career.”7    
It was during this time of apparently strong family-work conflicts in the early 20th 
century when fertility fell substantially and population replacement levels in many first-
wave developers hit their all-time lows. Figure 1.3 compares net reproduction trends for 
                                                          
6 In fact, the “competition” between FLFP and fertility has dominated much of the contemporary fertility 
literature as well, and has been well-supported in empirical examples (e.g., Butz and Ward 1979; Engelhardt 
et al. 2004; Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Kohler et al. 2006). Thus, while early scholars “speculated” about 
the causal relationship between FLFP and fertility, subsequent research well up into the 21st century has 
corroborated it with more sophisticated methodological techniques. 
7 Analyzing data from the Netherlands and United States, Hagestad and Call (2007) note that high levels of 
childlessness in the early 20th century served as “indications that some of these women may have been 
forerunners of what we consider a “modern” pattern: actively choosing childlessness and stable work 
engagement”. 
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select Northern/Western European countries, and shows that reproduction nadirs, that 
is, a long-term trough in fertility rates, occurred in the early 20th century, and that the 
indicator of generational reproduction, the cohort NRR, has risen, in some cases 
substantially, over the latter half of the 20th century. 8 
Figure 1.3:  Deviation from Cohort NRR=1 in select First-Wave Developers, 1901, 1950, and 
1979 Cohorts 
 
 
Source: Sardon (1991) for early 20th century cohort fertility data and Myrskylä et al. (2012) for late 20th 
century data9. Due to data constraints, Cohort NRR for Belgium and Germany in the first column represent 
1906 and 1905, respectively. 
While comparable cohort NRR data for the United States and Australia are not 
available, other indicators suggest that similarly rapid declines in fertility were taking 
place.  For instance, period NRRs in the mid-1930s in both countries attained below the 
replacement rate (Van Bavel 2010), and in economically progressive areas, childlessness 
                                                          
8 We compare cohort net reproduction rates rather than period NRRs because the former better reflects the 
actual number of children born to a birth cohort of women while the latter is a synthetic measure subject to 
distortive tempo effects (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). 
9 Because cohorts born in 1979 have not yet finished their childbearing years, we use Myrskylä et al.’s (2013) 
recently published cohort fertility projections. 
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levels rose to unprecedentedly high levels (approaching 30% in the northeastern US 
and 25-30% in Australia) (Morgan 1991; Rowland 2007).   
As the 20th century progressed, gender roles in first-wave developers became 
more egalitarian. Hence, while the first forty years of the early 20th century in 
Western/Northern Europe and the English-speaking countries were dominated by rigid 
gender roles and a strong work-family conflict, the latter half was characterized by a 
departure from these traditional gender norms, a trend towards more gender equity both 
within the family and in the labor market, and a greater prevalence of dual-career 
households.  
This enormous transformation over several decades is measureable using data on 
the relative and absolute division of household labor.  Using time-budget surveys for the 
UK and the US, Gershuny and Robinson (1988) for example showed that women’s 
participation in household work declined substantially from the 1960s to 1980s, while 
men’s participation increased (though remained much less than that of women).  Their 
findings closely paralleled similar findings for other first-wave developers, like Canada, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway, indicating fairly widespread progress during this 
time period toward a more egalitarian division of household labor in among first-wave 
developers. There are some current high-income countries, such as Japan and Korea, that 
continue to have a less egalitarian division of household labor; but these countries are 
second-wave developers, and this lagging behind in gender equity is predicted by our 
theory. Moreover, it should be noted that these macro-level observations do not capture 
significant heterogeneity in gender equity change.  It has been well-documented that 
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behavioral and attitudinal changes first emerged among the highly educated before 
diffusing to other educational and socioeconomic groups (Bianchi et al. 2000). 
 Nearly 12 years later, Bianchi et al. (2000) found the trend toward household 
gender equity had continued so much so that household work had nearly been cut in half 
for women in the US since 1965, and doubled for men during this period.  An 
international comparison of unpaid work trends by Hook (2006) revealed similar 
optimistic results: over-time increases in unpaid work by men in Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK.  Other recent studies have 
found similar longitudinal advances in household gender equity throughout Western 
countries (e.g., Sullivan and Coltrane 2008; Bianchi et al. 2007).  Lastly, a comparison of 
OECD countries shows that by and large, Northern/Western European and English-
speaking countries have the smallest gap in the number of minutes women and men 
perform in unpaid work, while East Asian and Southern/Eastern European countries have 
the largest (Miranda 2011). 
 Inequalities persist with regards to both the  “quality” and “quantity” of household 
labor in “first-wave developers”: women continue to bear most of the burden in the 
number of minutes spent on household labor, and the type of unpaid work performed by 
each gender varies (with men taking on more “masculine” tasks like yard work and home 
repair, and women more “feminine” tasks like cooking and cleaning) (Bianchi et al. 
2007; England 2010; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010).  Yet despite persisting 
inequalities, it is impressive how much these disparities have shrunk over such a short 
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time horizon.  As Sullivan and Coltrane (2008) optimistically describe, “men and 
women may not be fully equal yet, but the rules of the game have been profoundly and 
irreversibly changed…[a]ll these trends are likely to continue for the foreseeable future.”  
It is worth noting that the aforementioned changes in household gender norms 
have contributed to shaping distinct work-family relationships across cohorts. This is 
particularly well documented for the United States, given the availability of detailed 
cohort studies, but we believe that these changes have occurred similar in other first-wave 
developers. Specifically, in a seminal study of the evolution of the work-family conflict 
over the 20th century, Goldin (2004) traces the career and family experiences of five 
cohorts of college-educated women in the United States.  The work-family paths 
identified by Goldin include: “family or career” (Cohort 1, graduated 1900-1919), “job 
then family” (Cohort 2, graduated 1920-1945), “family then job” (Cohort 3, graduated 
1946-1965), “career then family” (Cohort 4, graduated 1966-1979), and finally, “career 
and family” (Cohort 5, graduated 1980-1990).  Goldin’s concludes that “[e]ach 
[generation] stepped into a society and a labor market with loosened constraints and 
shifting barriers.  The road was not only long, but it has also been winding…only recently 
has a substantial group been able to grasp both [work and family] at the same time” 
(Goldin 2004, p. 34; italics not in original).10  
                                                          
10 A recent literature has started to revisit the relationship between schooling and fertility in highly developed 
societies, and some studies have claimed that the fertility of highly-educated women has been rising. While 
this is correct, there is currently no evidence that the schooling gradient in fertility has changed in 
fundamental ways for women. For instance, in Norway (the world’s second most “prosperous” country, after 
Luxembourg, in terms of GDP per capita), Kravdal and Rindfuss (2008) show that more recent birth cohorts 
of higher educated women (born 1960-1964) have much higher fertility and lower levels of childlessness 
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1.3 Gender-Equity Dividend 
 
Our discussion above highlighted that trends towards gender equity, and 
divergences in the pace of such trends across countries, are central to understanding 
contemporary fertility patterns and their cross-country variation. Yet, despite this 
centrality, the determinants of movements towards gender equity (or the lack thereof) 
continue to be somewhat poorly understood. A large body of literature stresses social, 
political, and economic explanations (such as the second-wave Feminist movement, 
structural changes in the labor market, the introduction of the pill, and the 
implementation of family friendly policies) as drivers of the great gender equity advances 
which began in the 1960s/1970s in many first-wave developers (see, for example, 
Esping-Andersen 2009; Bianchi et al. 2000; Bianchi et al. 2007; Sullivan and Coltrane 
2008; Goldin 1990).  Adding to these existing explanations, we propose a novel 
demographic explanation. Specifically, we believe that these changes towards gender 
equity during the 2nd half of the 20th century were facilitated by an age structure that 
fosters greater marital bargaining power for women. 
In a related literature, the “demographic dividend” refers to a period during which 
a country’s age structure provides infrastructure for economic growth (Bloom et al. 
2003).  According to this theory, a bulge of working age cohorts allows for high 
productivity while smaller older and younger cohorts minimize dependency ratios.  Few 
                                                          
than their older counterparts (born 1940-1955); however, higher educated women still have fewer kids than 
less educated Norwegian women.  For other Scandinavian countries, Andersson et al. (2009) find that 
although fertility differentials by education in Northern Europe have begun to dissipate, highly educated 
women still have fewer children than their less educated counterparts. 
 
 
 
15 
scholars would argue that the “demographic dividend” is a primary driver of economic 
development. Instead, the demographic dividend refers to a favorable population age 
structure that can facilitate socioeconomic development by increasing savings, human 
capital investments and female labor force participation.   
Paralleling this logic of a favorable age distribution for economic development, 
we argue that there also exists a population age distribution that facilitates advances in 
gender equity via greater spousal bargaining power as a result of changes in the  “relative 
scarcity” of women in the marriage market. A marriage squeeze occurs when eligible 
females outnumber eligible males or vice-versa (Schoen 1983).  While often discussed as 
a phenomenon in the African American community where local sex-ratios are often 
distorted due to high rates of incarceration and mortality among marriage-age black men, 
a marriage squeeze can also occur at the population level as a delayed consequence of 
rapid fertility declines and the resulting subsequent changes in the population age 
structure at young adult ages.   
Theoretically, when the supply of females is greater than that of males, females 
experience greater competition in the marriage market amongst themselves and lose 
bargaining power in potential marriages (Guttentag and Secord 1983; Angrist 2002).  
After all, a man who wishes to marry a  “traditional” or homemaker wife has better 
chances to do so when he has more women from which to choose.  The opposite should 
hold true when males are in a marriage squeeze: they face greater competition in the 
marriage market and therefore, to succeed in the marriage market, men must be willing to 
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“pay a higher price” for a potential spouse (Guttentag and Secord 1983; Angrist 2002). 
Greater gender equity within the household is one aspect through which this “higher 
price” is likely to be reflected. Specifically, for women, a larger pool of men translates 
into more easily finding men with desirable characteristics, including men who are more 
supportive of equitable gender ideologies. Individuals may not make conscious decisions 
based on knowledge of skewed sex ratios; however, this is not important.  As Guttentag 
and Secord explain: 
It is not a matter of directly perceiving the sex ratio.  Rather, as a result of continuing experiences 
in encounters with the opposite sex, the average individual whose gender is in the minority 
occasionally has more alternatives in terms of actual or potential partners, whereas the opposite 
sex has fewer such alternatives.  From time to time, this produces a one-up, one-down situation 
that leads the party whose gender is in the minority to have higher expectations for outcomes in an 
existing relationship and less willingness to commit oneself, while the individual of the opposite 
sex feels a greater dependency on the existing relationship and is willing to give more.  When the 
sex ratio is considerably out of balance, the widespread effects increase the visibility of desirable 
alternatives for the scarce gender, and the injustices and exploitations undergone by the gender in 
oversupply become more salient.”  (1983:162) 
We illustrate the effects of this marriage squeeze in two scenarios:  
Imagine a population closed to migration in which the NRR for time t-40 to t-20 
is 1.65, yielding an annual intrinsic growth rate of 2% during this period (Figure 4a).  
Because men marry, on average, at older ages than women (Van Bavel 2012; Heer and 
Grossbard-Shechtman 1981; Angrist 2002), the age distribution in this growing marriage 
market in this population (ages 20-40) makes it advantageous for older men to search for 
younger women, as the supply of younger female cohorts is greater than that of older 
male cohorts.   
Now imagine the reverse scenario: a population closed to migration has an annual 
NRR of .60 during time t-40 to t-20 and an intrinsic growth rate of -2%, rendering each 
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successive birth cohort smaller than the previous, like in Figure 1.4b.  If women 
continue to marry somewhat older men, as has empirically been the case even during 
periods of a marriage squeeze, females in each birth cohort have a larger supply of men 
from which to choose.   
 
Figure 1.4a and 1.4b:  Growing and Shrinking 20-40 Year Old Marriageable Populations 
 
 
We argue that the age-structure implications of the sub-replacement fertility levels  
(i.e., NRRs<1) experienced in the early 20th century by first-wave developers played a 
role in advancing gender equity at young adult ages during the mid to late half of the 
century.  Specifically, low fertility in the early 20th century resulted in mid-20th century 
age structures that largely resembled scenario 2 around primary marriage and 
childbearing ages: cohorts of older males in the 20-40 marriage market outnumbered 
younger cohorts of females.  These age structures coincided with a period of rising 
female labor force participation as well as an emergence of quantifiable changes in 
gender norms. In our opinion, this co-occurrence was not a coincidence. Instead, that a 
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gender-equity dividend has occurred as a result of the age-structure at young adult ages 
that implied a relative scarcity of women relative to men given the prevailing age-
difference between (potential) spouses.  Specifically, early 20th century periods of low 
fertility, brought on in part from a strong work-family conflict and low household gender 
equity at the time (see above), created an age structure conducive to increasing 
bargaining power of women and increasing household gender equity.  In turn, these gains 
in household gender equity weakened the work-family conflict and thus contributed to a 
stabilization of fertility declines or even an increase in fertility in subsequent years.11  
Emphasizing this interrelationship is important, as it illustrates a homeostatic relationship 
of bi-directional causality between fertility and gender equity: low (household) gender 
equity causes persistent low fertility, and through its effect on the population age 
structure, with some delay, low fertility (and time) facilitates gender equity change by 
affecting male-female bargaining power within the household. We refer to this latter 
effect as the gender-equity dividend.  But similar to the demographic dividend, the 
benefits of this gender-equity dividend do occur not automatically or necessarily unfold 
at the same pace; institutional factors, such as flexibility of labor markets, institutional 
restrictions to the expansion of day care, or tax disincentives for dual career couples can 
slow down and/or limit the unfolding of the gender-equity dividend, just as the 
demographic dividend can be reduced by unfavorable institutional frameworks. 
                                                          
11 As part of changing gender equity, assortative mating patterns have changed, as evidenced by the widely 
documented pattern of increased educational homogamy.  
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To support the connection between age structure and gender norm changes that 
are postulated to occur as part of our theory, the population pyramids in Figure 1.5 
illustrate the existence of the gender-equity dividend in select first-wave developers in 
1955. All of these countries are characterized by a relative scarcity of women as 
compared to men at marriage and primary childbearing ages given the prevailing age-
difference between spouses. In contrast, the population pyramids in Figure 1.6 show the 
age structure for select second-wave developers in that same year, none of which have an 
age structure that would be conducive to a gender-equity dividend. Consistent with our 
theory of the effect of a marriage squeeze on subsequent trends towards gender equity, 
the different age-patterns for first-wave developers (Figures 1.5) and second-wave 
developers (Figure 1.6) align with the higher levels of gender equity in the former as 
compared to the latter countries. 
Because the mean age of marriage in first-wave developers in the mid-century 
was around 25 for men and 22 for women (as indicated in Table 1.1 and 1.2 below), the 
“gender-equity dividend” would have largely begun with marriage market imbalances 
between 1950-1960.  Yet the increased bargaining power engendered by declining 
subsequent cohorts does not stop at marriage: a heightened “threat point of divorce” 
favorable to women presumably followed these cohorts over time.  In other words, the 
male cohorts involved in the gender-equity dividend faced an unfavorable re-marriage 
market over their primary adult ages, during which decisions about fertility and 
childrearing are made.   
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Figure 1.5:  Population Age Structures in Select First-Wave Developers (1955). 
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Figure 1.6:  Population Age Structures in Select Second-Wave Developers (1955) 
 
 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide the mean age at first marriage for men and women in 
all the countries examined, as well as attempts to quantifiably capture the gender-equity 
dividend.  We note that, on average, men marry women 3 years younger than them.  
Dividing the number of females aged 20-25 by the number of males aged 25-30 provides 
numeric support that older males outnumbered younger females in first-wave developers 
but not in second-wave developers in the mid-20th century.   Theoretically, these age 
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structures provided the demographic infrastructure for first-wave developers to make 
strides in creating advances in household gender equity. 
 Two important points regarding the gender-equity dividend should be 
emphasized. 
First, when stating our key assumption to the gender-equity dividend – that men 
marry at older ages than women – an intuitive question arises: why don’t men match with 
women closer to their age if they face a scarcity of younger women?  The mid-century 
marriage squeeze did indeed correspond to shifts in marriage timing (e.g., between 1951 
and 1978, mean age at marriage for American men decreased .54 years and increased .53 
for American women), though these shifts were symmetric for men and women and fairly 
modest in magnitude, and thus did not eliminate the marriage squeeze.  This limited 
ability to reduce the marriage squeeze by adjusting the gender-gap in the age at marriage  
is likely due to the fact that cohort size composition among individuals aged 20-40 took 
place abruptly in the 1950s (i.e., the marriage squeeze did not sprout up gradually, but 
rather, quickly).  Thus, when the marriage squeeze began, women of similar age to men 
were likely married, and men therefore had to marry downward in age.  For a new 
equilibrium in the mean age of marriage for men and women to emerge, the marriage 
squeeze would necessarily need to occur over longer periods of time (and marriage 
squeezes in Asia as a result of distorted sex ratios may be an example for this process; see 
Guilmoto 2012). 
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And second, it is important to emphasize that the benefits of the gender-equity 
dividend are unlikely to be reaped in the absence of institutional, cultural, and economic 
factors that promote greater gender equity.  These factors, including rises in female labor 
force participation, gender equity oriented policies, and cultural shifts in women’s rights 
are arguably the most important catalysts to changes in gender equity attitudes/behaviors, 
whereas the gender-equity dividend is simply a facilitator of these changes.  
Table 1.1:  Ratio Males (25-30)/Females(20-25) and Mean Age at Marriage by Sex (1955) in 
First-Wave Developers 
 
Country 
Males 25-30  
(thousands) 
Females 
20-25 
(thousands) 
 Males (25-
30)/Females(20-25) 
Mean Age 
At Marriage 
(Males) 
Mean Age At 
Marriage 
(Females) 
Sweden  236   212  1.11 26.20 23.20 
France  1,633   1,539  1.06 25.30 22.50 
US  6,108   5,582  1.09 23.30 20.60 
Belgium  328   311  1.05 24.80 22.00 
Norway  117   101  1.17 25.60 22.20 
UK  1,700   1,629  1.04 24.80 21.80 
 Notes: Due to data unavailability for 1955, mean age at marriage represents values in 1960. 
      
Table 1.2: Ratio Males (25-30)/Females (20-25) and Mean Age At Marriage By Sex (1955) in 
Second-Wave Developers 
 
Country 
Males 25-30  
(thousands) 
Females 20-25 
(thousands) 
 Males (25-
30)/Females(20-25) 
Mean Age At 
Marriage 
(Males) 
Mean Age 
At Marriage 
(Females) 
Spain  1,240   1,327  0.93 27.90 24.70 
Italy  1,912   1,964  0.97 28.50 24.70 
Japan  3,723   4,170  0.89 27.30 24.70 
Korea  635   946  0.67 25.20 21.30 
 Notes: Due to data unavailability for 1955, mean age at marriage represents values in 1960. 
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There has been a fragmented discussion in the literature supporting the idea that 
population age structures exerted catalytic pressure on gender norms in first-wave 
developers.  In Sweden, for example, Kabeer (2007) and Florin and Nilsson (1999) argue 
that sustained low fertility throughout the early 20th century and rapid economic growth 
led to labor shortages in the 1960s.  Kabeer (2007, p. 249) asserts that the small nation of 
about 7.5 million had “a choice between encouraging immigration or persuading [more] 
women to increase their labor force participation”.  Gender advocates, backed by 
Sweden’s strong labor unions, supported the latter position, prompting political parties to 
incorporate the ideals of gender equity in their platforms (Sandqvist 1992; Florin and 
Nilsson 1999; Kabeer 2007). “Getting mom a job and making dad pregnant”, as put by 
one young parliamentarian in the 1970s, encapsulates the direction in which Swedish 
society wished to move (Klinth 2002).   A string of policies and initiatives were to follow 
in order to get men and fathers more involved in family life and women more involved in 
the labor market (Nagy 2008; Klinth 2008). 
A similar story unfolded in the United States.  Decades of low immigration due to 
the restrictive “Johnson-Reed Act” combined with low levels of fertility from the 20s 
through early 1940s gave rise to a marriage squeeze for men—that is, an age structure 
favorable to women in the marriage market (see Figure 1.5 above).  Heer and Grossbard-
Shechtman (1981, p. 62) contend that “the marriage squeeze [of the 1950s and 60s] was 
instrumental in reducing not only the proportion of females who could marry but also the 
compensation which men were obliged to give women for traditional wifely and maternal 
duties”.  
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1.4 Fertility and Gender Equity In Second-Wave Developers  
 
Whereas Northern/Western European and the English-speaking countries 
experienced rapid industrialization in the mid-19th/early 20th century, second-wave 
developers constitute a group of countries that have experienced sustained large increases 
in living standards and development primarily from the mid-20th century onwards. 
Second-wave developers include countries in Southern Europe, East Asia, and to an 
arguable extent, Eastern Europe.  While a characterization of second-wave developers 
based on the timing of industrialization is sufficient for our purposes, indicators such as 
GDP growth rates and historical human development index (HDI) figures can be used to 
confirm the grouping of these countries as “second-wave developers” (see Appendix I; 
see also, Crafts 2002, Maddison 2007, and Galor and Moav 2004). 
While institutional gender equity (in labor market and educational opportunities) 
has increased in second-wave developers over the last half-century, often at very rapid 
pace, it has been widely documented that family-oriented gender equity in these second-
wave developers lagged behind those in the first-wave developers (Esping-Andersen 
2009).  And the differences in household gender equity measures between first and 
second-wave developers remain substantial to date.  For example, in second-wave 
developers like Italy, Portugal, Japan, and Korea, women perform a daily average of 
three to four hours more of unpaid work (i.e., household tasks) than men; in first-wave 
developers like Denmark, Sweden, the USA, and Belgium, this figure lies within one to 
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two hours (Miranda 2011).12 Furthermore, strong family values that stress marriage, 
discourage cohabitation, and encourage traditional breadwinner norms persist across 
second-wave developers (Reher 1998; Anderson and Kohler 2013). 
Differences in fertility trends between first and second-wave developers have also 
been salient.  While cohort fertility levels in most first-wave developers remained 
relatively stable from 1950-197913, they have fallen—in many cases substantially—over 
the same period in second-wave developers (Myrskylä et al. 2013).  Furthermore, very 
low period TFRs (between 1.0-1.4 children per woman) over the last two decades have 
been documented almost exclusively in second-wave developers (Kohler et al. 2002; 
Goldstein et al. 2009).  Many studies argue that fertility differentials between countries 
that we classify as first-wave and second-wave developers are driven in large part 
because of a strong-work family conflict in second-wave developers (e.g., Myrskylä et al. 
2013; McDonald 2013; Esping-Andersen 2009). 
While the gap between institutional and family-oriented gender equity remains 
large in second-wave developers, there is evidence that some second-wave developers are 
entering an incipient stage of change regarding gender norms and family values similar to 
what first-wave developers underwent in the 1970s.  For instance, Rindfuss et al. (2004, 
p. 843) make a compelling case that “major changes in Japan have converged to create 
                                                          
12 While we report absolute differences in unpaid work, the relative differences between first and second-
wave developers are equally stark.  For example, in Denmark the ratio of men/women unpaid work 
differences stands around 72% while in Korea the ratio hovers around 20% (Miranda 2011). 
13 Cohorts not having finished their childbearing years (e.g., 1965-1979) have been projected by Myrskylä et 
al. (2013) 
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conditions favorable for dramatic family change”.14  Their conclusion stems from 
mounting tensions between traditional family expectations and changes in the labor 
market, educational system, consumer preferences, and women’s desires for greater 
gender equity in marriage.  Similar findings of the nascent breakdown of traditional 
family norms have been observed in other second-wave developers, like Spain, where 
“[y]oung parents behave increasingly like Americans when it comes to who reads with 
the children and who washes the dishes” (Esping-Andersen 2009, p. 173).  While too 
early to make definitive claims, second-wave developers may soon be following first-
wave developers in adopting a more equitable gender regime. 
1.5 Theory 
In light of the aforesaid historical and contemporary trends, we postulate that 
countries attain very low fertility rates following periods of fast-paced socioeconomic 
development.  During this period, rapid gains in institutional gender equity are made while 
family gender equity lags; in other words, women’s access to education and employment 
increases rapidly while family/household norms remain unchanged or change only 
gradually.  This period of incoherent levels of gender equity in individually oriented social 
institutions and family-oriented social institutions leads to a “work-family conflict” for 
                                                          
14 Feyrer et al. (2008, p. 21) express similar optimism for European countries where household norms remain 
traditional:  “In the lowest fertility European countries the progress of women is limited both in the workforce 
and in the household relative to other high income countries.  We see this as a temporary state.  The social 
structure in these countries and the division of child care has led women to choose to have fewer children 
than did their mothers, but we see no reason why these social factors cannot also work in the other direction 
and lead to future increases in fertility.” 
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career-oriented women (e.g., McDonald 2013; Bellavia and Frone 2005; Schreffler et al. 
2010).  As a result of this disequilibrium in gender equity, a period of low fertility emerges 
and persists, often lasting several decades.  With some delay, the low fertility resulting 
from these work-family conflicts can subsequently facilitate changes toward greater gender 
equity through a gender-equity dividend that results in a relative scarcity of women relative 
to men as a result of the age-structure at young-adult ages.   Indicators of familial gender 
norms becoming more equitable include greater participation by males in household and 
childrearing tasks, and attitudinal shifts supporting dual-earning partnerships.  These 
changes are facilitated by favorable social, demographic, and economic factors, which, 
similar to the demographic dividend in relation to economic development, open a window 
of opportunity for advances in household gender equity.  
Our theoretical framework can be directly incorporated as part of the demographic 
transition (see Figure 1.7).  In Phase 4, fertility drops to sub-replacement levels, in part due 
to an incongruence between traditional family gender equity and modern institutional 
gender equity that results in a substantial work-family conflict.  Over time, family-oriented 
gender equity “catches up” to institutional gender equity as a consequence of institutional, 
societal, cultural, economic, and—as we introduce in this paper —demographic changes, 
effectively weakening the work-family conflict.  As a result, having both a career and 
family becomes more compatible, leading to less voluntary childlessness and relatively 
higher fertility rates.  If one were to place developed countries in the transition in Figure 
1.7, Western/Northern European and English-speaking countries, the forerunners of the 
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demographic transition and industrialization, would fall roughly in Phase 5.  Southern 
Europe and East Asian countries, most of which began developing in the 20th century, 
would fall in Phase 4 of the transition.  With a weak work-family conflict and near-
replacement fertility, Sweden and Denmark are arguably the closest countries to reach 
Phase 6.  Ironically, these two countries were cited by Van de Kaa (1987, p. 11) as the 
frontrunners of the Second Demographic Transition —a theory that presumes long-term 
sub-replacement fertility (Lesthaeghe 2010).15  
We should point out that in Phase 6 a convergence between actual and desired 
fertility levels occurs —not necessarily a return to replacement level.  Nonetheless, the 
Figure is drawn under the assumption that desired fertility levels roughly equate to 
replacement level fertility, as desired fertility in nearly all developed countries hovers 
around 2-2.2 children per woman (Sobotka and Beaujouan 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Van de Kaa (1987, p. 11) states that Denmark and Sweden are the “[o]nly two European countries [that] 
appear to have experienced the full sequence of changes in family formation that have led to very low 
fertility”. 
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Figure 1.7:  Extended Demographic Transition 
  
1.6 Empirical Support 
 
 Our theoretical framework integrates well with recent empirical analyses that 
have started to re-evaluate the relationship between socioeconomic development and 
fertility.  Bongaarts and Watkins (1996), for example, use the Human Development Index 
(HDI) and show a strong linear negative fertility-development association.  More 
recently, Myrskylä et al. (2009) demonstrated the emergence of a J-curve relationship 
between fertility and HDI, suggesting that very advanced levels of socioeconomic 
development may cause fertility decline reversals, Several recent studies have 
investigated this in more detail using both micro and macro data, and despite some 
criticisms of Myrskylä et al.’s (2009) findings (e.g., Harttgen and Vollmer 2014; Furuoka 
2009), there is increasing empirical and theoretical support that the relationship between 
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development and fertility has fundamentally changed in recent decades among the 
most developed countries (e.g., Harknett et al 2014; Testa 2014; and Luci-Greulich and 
Thévenon 2014). 
Deviating somewhat from the above literature on the J-curve relationship between 
fertility and HDI, we argue in this paper that the – in historical comparison small  – 
changes in recent development per se are not driving the reversal in fertility declines. 
Instead, within our long-term perspective, we argue that relatively high and stable fertility 
levels are prevalent in countries that began developing in the 19th/early 20th century (e.g., 
Norway, the USA, the Netherlands, Australia, Sweden, etc.).16  Specifically, consistent 
with the theory outlined here, thanks to greater gender equity that has emerged in these 
first-wave developers as a result of the gender-equity dividend in the second half of the 
20th century, it has become more feasible for women to balance a work and family life.  
As a result of this head-start in development, these countries also tend to be ranked highly 
at or near the top of development indices such as the HDI.   Nevertheless, their relatively 
high fertility levels are not due to simply achieving a certain threshold of development. 
Instead, the relatively high current fertility is rather due to having established a society in 
which evolved familial norms have made work and family more compatible, an 
accomplishment that was in part facilitated by the gender-equity dividend occurring 
earlier in the 20th century.  
                                                          
16 While period total fertility rates for some first-wave developers fluctuated quite markedly during the latter 
half of the 20th century, cohort total fertility rates remained relatively stable (see Myrskylä et al. 2013).  
Sweden is a prime example: its period total fertility rate fluctuated from 2.13 in 1990 to 1.5 in 1999, though 
cohort fertility in Sweden has hovered around 2 births per woman for women born 1930-1965. 
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Emphasizing this mechanism leading to gender equity, our theory therefore can 
reconcile the “puzzles” such as S. Korea and Japan in Myrskylä et al.’s (2009) J-shape 
relation between fertility and development. Specifically, while they have quickly caught 
up in literacy, life expectancy, and wealth over the last 50 years, second-wave developers 
with comparable HDI levels as second-wave developers (e.g., Japan, South Korea, and 
Hong Kong) are outliers to the J-curve relationship because persisting low gender equity 
drives fertility to very low levels.17  These countries have (not yet) benefitted from the 
gender-equity dividend. Thus, even as the East Asian or Southern/Eastern European 
countries attain higher HDI levels, it seems unlikely to us that fertility (and specifically, 
the quantum of fertility) would rebound significantly to higher levels without changes in 
gender regimes. But they are likely to do so in the future. 
As Goldin (2004) rightfully points out, only recently has the possibility of 
combining a job and family become widespread throughout all income and educational 
strata in the United States.18  We must continually remind ourselves that it took more than 
a century from the onset of industrialization for this process to occur, and for the 
attitudinal, institutional, and economic groundwork to be laid to facilitate the balance of 
work and family in first-wave developers (and even among first-wave developers, the 
balance of work and family is often still challenging).  From this logic, it becomes clear 
that time has served as a crucial ingredient for lagging household gender equity to catch 
                                                          
17 Other contributing factors to East Asia’s ultra-low fertility rates, such as a stronger “quality-quantity” 
tradeoff have also been tied to the region’s fast pace development story (Anderson and Kohler 2013). 
18 Goldin makes this observation for educated women in the United States, but we argue that it is applicable 
to other first-wave developers. 
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up with institutional gender equity.  This is consistent with the cultural lag theory 
(Ogburn 1922), as well as recent theoretical developments that emphasize slowly-
changing schemas as major determinants of fertility change (Johnson-Hanks et al., 2011). 
On the surface, therefore, a simple explanation for why second-wave developers face a 
strong work-family conflict is that second-wave developers have simply not had enough 
time for family-oriented gender equity to catch up to institutional oriented gender equity. 
On a deeper level, this lag in fertility response is related to the change of underlying 
norms, schemas, and institutions, which respond gradually and only with delay to 
changes in educational and occupational opportunities for women. 
Thus, we hypothesize that the prevailing traditionalism regarding family norms, 
sex roles, and gender equity in Southern/Eastern Europe and East Asia is partly 
attributable to the fact that the onset of rapid socioeconomic development in these 
countries occurred much later than the first-wave developers, and that the pace of 
development occurred at such a fast rate that household gender equity started to lag 
behind, resulting in a mismatch between institutional and household gender equity in 
many second-wave developers that often persists until today.  Given the close connection 
between low gender equity and low fertility, the fast pace and late onset of development 
contribute to second-wave developers’ low fertility rates via low gender equity. A 
corollary of this finding for comparative cross-country studies is that the pace of 
development should be a predictor of how low fertility drops towards the end of the 
fertility transition. 
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HDI figures for 1950 plotted against 2010 period fertility and completed 
fertility for the 1979 cohort lend support to our hypothesis:  the most developed countries 
in the mid-20th century—all first-wave developers—have, on average, substantially 
higher fertility than second-wave developers.  Among all developed countries, HDI 
figures for 2012 explain only about 18% of completed cohort fertility variation (for the 
1979 birth cohort) and 22% of 2010 period fertility variation (see Figure 1.8).  
Remarkably, HDI estimates for the same countries in 1950 are much better predictors of 
today’s fertility trends, explaining about 60% of current variation in both period and 
cohort fertility.  While the graphs say nothing about family policies, gender equity, or 
labor market flexibility, the 1950 HDI figures suggest that the pace and the onset of 
development are much more explanatory of current fertility trends than present-day 
development levels.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 As is apparent in Figures 1.7 and 1.8, while the pace and onset of development are strong predictors of 
how low fertility will drop, they do not fully explain heterogeneity in specific lowest levels of fertility. 
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Figure 1.8: Top Left-Cohort Fertility (1979) on HDI 1950; Top Right-Period Fertility 
(2010) on HDI 1950; Bottom Left-Cohort Fertility (1979) on HDI 2012; Bottom Right-
Period Fertility (2010) on HDI 2012 
 
 
Source: 1950 HDI estimates from Crafts (2002) and 1979 Cohort Fertility values from Myrskylä et al.             
(2012) 
 A similar pattern prevails when using GDP growth rates as the proxy for 
development pace: regressing present-day fertility measures (i.e., 1979 cohort fertility) on 
Maddison’s computed GDP growth rates from 1950-1973 illustrates that among today ’s 
developed countries, those that experienced fast economic growth during the mid-century 
currently have the lowest fertility rates, while relatively high fertility prevails in countries 
that experienced only moderate growth during this time. 
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Figure 1.9: Cohort Fertility (1979) on Annual Average GDP/Capita Growth (1950-1973) 
 
     Source:  Myrskylä et al. (2012) and Maddison (2007) 
1.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
Adopting a long-term perspective of low fertility across the 20th century, this paper 
provides novel theoretical insights into the interrelations between low fertility, 
socioeconomic development, and gender equity.   We have argued that the pace and onset 
of socioeconomic development are inherently linked with different gender equity 
regimes—a key driver of fertility variation within developed countries. Moreover, the pace 
of socioeconomic development emerges in our framework as a predictor of how low 
fertility drops towards the end of the fertility transition. We also shed light on a 
demographic feedback mechanism we call the gender-equity dividend.  During this 
dividend, a young adult age structure (caused by below-replacement fertility) yields a 
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relative scarcity of women relative to men (given the prevailing gender-differences in 
the age at marriage).  In turn, these age structures facilitate changes in gender norms in the 
egalitarian direction through increased female bargaining power. Greater gender equity is 
then likely to help raise or stabilize fertility in low-fertility high-income countries. In this 
process, therefore, the emergence of below-replacement fertility implies a homeostatic 
mechanism that over the medium/long-term can contribute to increases in fertility, such as 
has been documented in some advanced countries with high levels of gender equity in 
recent decades. This theory helps explain the fertility pattern in countries such as S. Korea, 
where a rapid decline in fertility during the demographic transition has resulted in very low 
contemporary fertility levels associated with relatively high levels of household gender 
inequity. Piecing together these insights, we propose a variant of the demographic 
transition that accounts for the interplay between changes in fertility and changes in gender 
equity. 
Should our theory hold up, fertility will nudge closer to desired fertility levels in 
the today’s “developed world” as the gap between incoherent “institutional” and “family” 
oriented gender equity continues to close. This will not only continue to occur in first-wave 
developers but also begin to accelerate in second-wave developers. 
Furthermore, if one assumes the development of incongruent realms of gender 
equity is inevitable and generalizable, today’s swiftly developing countries (including 
China, India, and Brazil, where nearly 3 of the world’s 7 billion citizens live) could well 
enter periods of very low fertility.  Indeed, such a scenario is already playing out in in 
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Brazil, where fertility has been below the replacement level for nearly a decade, and 
urban China, where cities like Shanghai have documented TFRs under one (Lutz 2009; 
see also, Lutz 2008). Our theoretical framework gives reason to cautiously speculate that 
“third-wave” developers” – including countries such as China, Brazil, and India – could 
replace second-wave developers as the new frontier of low and lowest-low fertility in the 
21st century. 
 Necessarily a broad theory of development and fertility such as the one presented 
here oversimplifies a number of complex, nuanced aspects of the interrelations between 
low fertility, socioeconomic development, and gender equity. As a result, this paper 
suffers from a number of limitations.  
The first limitation is that our theory does not take into account other factors 
contributing to low fertility. We highlight some processes, including changing gender 
norms during the development process, that in our opinion had a profound impact on 
fertility across many contexts and at different time periods, and which are essential for 
understanding future fertility patterns in high-income countries that have had experienced 
persistent low fertility for a substantial period, and middle-income countries into which 
below-replacement fertility is spreading. But it is also clear that incongruent levels of 
gender equity (i.e., a strong work-family conflict) were not the sole driver of low fertility 
in early 20th century, nor are they the sole driver of low fertility today (see Van Bavel 
(2010) and Caldwell and Schindlmayr (2002)).  Out of various economic, cultural, and 
social contexts emerge forces that either foster or hinder the realization of desired 
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fertility.  For example, economic conditions in Eastern Europe have been linked to low 
fertility since the fall of the Iron Curtain (e.g., Witte and Wagner 1995; Filipov and 
Dorbritz 2003; Caldwell and Schindlmayr 2002; Thornton and Philipov 2009).  In East 
Asia, the high pressure on parents to provide costly private education has elevated the 
price of children so much that many families face a strong quality-quantity trade-off 
(Anderson and Kohler 2013).20  And long-standing, high levels of youth unemployment 
may encourage childbearing postponement in Southern Europe, which has been 
documented as a driver of very low period TFRs and may impact completed childbearing 
levels (Kohler et al. 2002; Lutz et al. 2006). 
The second limitation of this paper is that it fails to adequately explain how the 
mid-century baby boom squares in with the story we tell, and why women in the 1940s-
1960s withdrew into housewifery.21  The baby boom was not only a period of high 
fertility and nuptiality, but also of traditional breadwinner roles in the household and a 
widespread acceptance of these roles (Coontz 2011).22  Several explanations exist as to 
why these transitorily reemerged as the hegemonic norms.  One explanation, put forth by 
Doepke et al. (2007), argues that younger women in mid-20th century were crowded out 
of the labor market by men who had returned from WWII and by older women who had 
                                                          
20 It has been argued that the surge in competition among youth, which has led to the a strong quality-quantity 
trade-off in the region, can be partly attributed to East Asia’s rapid socioeconomic development (Anderson 
and Kohler 2013). 
21 It is important to stress that there was significant heterogeneity in baby booms across high-income countries 
in the mid 20th century, both in terms of the “quantum” and “tempo” of fertility (Van Bavel and Reher 2013) 
22 Coontz (2011, p. 39) asserts that “even women who had experienced other models of family life and female 
behavior said that during the 1950s they came to believe that normal families were those where the wife and 
mother stayed at home, and that normal women were perfectly happy with that arrangement.”   
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gained experience in the labor market during the war. As a result of these worsening 
labor market prospects of young women, many decided to marry and have children. 
Another explanation for the return to traditional breadwinner roles during the baby boom 
is that high scale female labor force participation during WWII created a post-war 
environment in which working mothers became even more heavily stigmatized. Terms 
such a  “latchkey children” and “eight-hour orphans” were used during to war to refer to 
children whose “neglectful mothers” left them during work  (Zucker 1944). Just after the 
war, hostile attitudes toward working mothers disseminated throughout the country, and 
“a concerted effort developed to defend traditional values” (Chafe 1976, p. 16).23  
According to Chafe (1976, p. 20), “[m]agazines during the 1950s celebrated the virtues of 
“togetherness” and advertisers attempted to sell their product by showing families with 
four children—the ‘average’ American family—out on a picnic or vacation.  Public 
opinion polls showed that the vast majority of Americans did not question the traditional 
allocation of sex roles and believed that a woman’s primary place was in the home.  
Thus, while traditional breadwinner roles reigned during the baby boom era, spanning 
from the mid-1940s to early 1960s, female labor force participation aspirations remained 
lower than early 20th century levels in most countries (Appendix II).24  Ruggles (2015) 
argues that the period of the baby boom is unusual in the sense that an exceptionally 
                                                          
23 In 1944, the Chairman of the Womanpower Committee of the War Manpower Commission in the 
Cleveland area predicted that “[w]e can expect the voices of the supporters of the back to the home movement 
to be louder and stronger than in the days of the depression.  One of the reasons for this is because “[t]he 
consciousness of the value of children quickened through war and the belief that the child is best taken care 
of in the home by his mother” (Michel 1999, p. 49). 
24 In the United States, FLFP actually increased between 1900 to 1960, though this was likely due to a greater 
share of older women working (Doepke 2007) 
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strong male wage growth in the post-WWII years has prolonged the patriarchal family 
model that persisted earlier in the 20th century. Only this rapid wage male growth made a 
male-breadwinner model economically sustainable for a large fraction of the population, 
and along with it, the persistence of relatively traditional gender norms, a weak work-
family conflict, and as a result, relatively high fertility. But this period was unusual. 
Nevertheless, it is consistent with our framework in that a lack of gender equity and a 
weak work-family conflict (see bottom-right quadrant in Figure 1.2), driven in part by 
economic factors and unique post-WWII social and demographic factors, importantly 
contributed to the high fertility during the baby boom.  Hence, while our theory focuses 
on recent fertility trends in mostly high-income countries, the basic mechanisms of our 
framework are likely to have shaped the baby boom as well.25  
Countries that represent outliers to our theoretical framework present a potential 
third limitation of our theoretical model.  In particular, Germany and Austria stand out for 
being countries that began industrializing in the early 20th century along with other first-
wave developers.  Yet unlike other first-wave developers, Germany and Austria still 
exhibit very low fertility.  The German-speaking fertility pattern is unique compared to 
other low fertility settings in Europe due to its high rates of childlessness but relatively 
high progressions to second and third birth rates (Sobotka 2008).  Recent research 
suggests that institutional factors, such as family and labor market policies, likely explain 
                                                          
25 It is beyond the scope of this paper to do so, but we believe that our understanding of fertility dynamics 
would greatly benefit from empirical analyses on the origins and consequences of the baby boom that adopt 
the theoretical framework outlined in this paper. 
 
 
 
42 
the “Western European fertility divide” between Germany and other Western countries 
(Klüsener et al. 2013), and that Germany and Austria—along with the other Axis powers, 
Italy and Japan—experienced cultural and institutional responses to the war that have 
negatively impacted their fertility levels (Weinreb and Johnson-Hanks 2014).  Germany 
and Austria, like other first-wave developers, exhibited population age structures 
conducive to gender equity change in the mid-20th century; however, unlike places such 
as Sweden and the US, the institutional, cultural, and economic factors promoting greater 
gender equity were not present in Germany and Austria during their “gender-equity 
dividend”.  These two countries face a comparatively weak policy environment for 
career-oriented women wishing to have a family, as exemplified by a tax code that 
penalizes working mothers, and by a lack of inexpensive daycare facilities for dual-earner 
households. Moreover, it is common in Germany and Austria that working mothers 
participate in the labor market only part-time (that is, women have “one foot in the labor 
market and another in the traditional domestic sphere”), which, in effect, may not be 
sufficient to catalyze men’s adoption of more gender symmetric behavior. Hence, while 
the mechanisms underlying the gender-equity dividend are likely to have been at work in 
both Germany and Austria, the specific institutional context of these countries has limited 
the extent to which it resulted in increased gender equity, increased female labor force 
participation and higher fertility. While some of the specific institutional factors driving 
the somewhat distinct German and Austrian fertility regime have frequently been 
emphasized in the literature, the literature may still benefit from research that investigates 
why Germany and Austria have been slow to adopt the more family-friendly 
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environments that have arisen in other Northern/Western European countries and other 
first-wave developers during the 2nd half of the 20th century. 
Lastly, our theory does not account for important within-region and within-
country heterogeneity with regards to fertility, socioeconomic development, and gender 
norms.  Fertility rates as well as socioeconomic indicators between Southern Italy and 
Northern Italy, for example, differ starkly from one another (Caltabiano et al. 2009).  
Further research considering these important areas of heterogeneity may shed light on 
diffusional factors relating to gender equity change. 
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1.8 Appendix I: First- and Second-wave Developer Dichotomization 
 
 We use economic and development indicators (e.g., GDP and HDI) to 
dichotomize today’s “developed world” into first-wave and second-wave developers. 
 First we examine the percent change in HDI between 1950 and 2012.  HDI values 
for 2012 come from the United Nations (2012), and mid-century HDI figures from Crafts 
(2002).  One notes that countries that experienced large percent increases between 1950-
2012 in HDI, appearing to the right of the Figure, are clustered in East Asia (Singapore, 
Taiwan, Korea, and Japan), Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy), and 
Eastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland).  Conversely, countries that were 
relatively highly developed in the mid-century—first-wave developers—are clustered on 
the left of Figure 11. 
Some countries appear to have not changed much in “development” between 
1950 and 2012.  The UK is a prime example: life expectancy and GDP per capita in the 
UK increased substantially during this time period (69.280 years and $6,847 
$32,738, respectively), though the change in HDI lies around a mere 6.5%.   
The reason why the UK does not appear to have not progressed much is that 
yearly HDI calculations are made using different maximum values for the “health and 
wealth” components (life expectancy and GDP per capita).  Because our HDI figures for 
1950 are uniformly calculated using the same maximum value for all countries, the 
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percent change in HDI provides a useful tool to assess the speed with which our 
selected countries developed.26  For more information, see Crafts (2000). 
 
Figure 1.10: % HDI Change Between 1950 and 2012 
 
 We also examined the pace of economic growth in the early 20th century relative 
to the mid-20th century.  The idea is that countries that experienced rapid economic 
development in the early half of the century would fall into the “first-wave developer” 
category and those that experienced very fast growth in the mid to latter half of the 20th 
century would be considered “second-wave developers”.  We use average GDP per capita 
growth rates computed by Maddison (2007) for the periods 1913-1950 and 1950-1973.  
Dividing the second average by the first illustrates the ratio of growth between the two 
periods.  Thus, .5 for example would indicate that GDP growth during the period 1913-
                                                          
26 The United Nations recognizes that because their HDI calculations are relative, it poses difficulties for 
researchers in comparing HDI figures over time for individual countries.  The UN therefore released “Hybrid 
HDIs” for the years 1970-2010 which attempt to solve this problem.  However, we do not use these figures 
because they are not available before 1970 and therefore do not capture the advances in development made 
in the 1950s and 1960s in many developed countries. 
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1950 was half as much as between 1950-1973.  These values are illustrated in tabular 
as well as graphical form in Table 1.3 and Figure 1.11. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.11: GDP Annual Growth Rate Averages (1913-1950)/(1950-1973) 
Table 1.3: GDP Annual Growth Rate Averages (1913-1950)/(1950-1973) 
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Country 1913-1950 1950-1973 Ratio
Spain 0.17 5.79 0.029
Germany 0.17 5.02 0.034
Austria 0.18 4.94 0.036
Greece 0.5 6.21 0.081
Hungary 0.45 3.6 0.125
Italy 0.85 4.95 0.172
Belgium 0.7 3.55 0.197
Portugal 1.39 5.66 0.246
France 1.12 4.05 0.277
Netherlands 1.07 3.45 0.31
Australia 0.73 2.34 0.312
UK 0.92 2.44 0.377
Finland 1.91 4.25 0.449
Denmark 1.56 3.08 0.506
Canada 1.4 2.74 0.511
USA 1.61 2.45 0.657
Norway 2.13 3.19 0.668
Switzerland 2.06 3.08 0.669
Sweden 2.12 3.07 0.691
New Zealand 1.35 1.72 0.785
GDP Annual Growth Rate Average
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Some countries fit nicely within our dichotomous framework.  Clear first-wave 
developers would be the United Kingdom (UK), France, Sweden, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, the United States of America (USA), Iceland, Canada, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Belgium, Finland, Norway, Australia, and Austria.  
Second-wave developers would include Spain, Italy, Portugal, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Poland, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Hungary. 
Some countries lie somewhere between first and second-wave developers.  Above 
all, Germany, Italy, and Japan share characteristics with both first-wave and second-
wave developers. On the one hand, these three countries had experienced economic growth 
and improvements in living standards prior to WWII, and were integral players in the early 
20th century global economy.  On the other hand, the war-torn and politically fragmented 
Axis powers all experienced drastic setbacks in living standards during the war (see Scheck 
2008; Zamagni 1993; and Dower 2000). These years of hardship were followed by 
“economic miracles” (“il miracolo economico” in Italian, “Der Wirtschaftswunder” in 
German, and  “高度経済成長” in Japanese), which set the course for these “post-war re-
developers” to quickly improve living standards and regain their foothold as economic 
powerhouses.  Thus, while post-war re-developers historically align with first-wave 
developers, they have experienced quick development over the second half of the 20th 
century, and as such, share many of the same demographic and social characteristics with 
other second-wave developers. 
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1.9 Appendix II: Historical Female Labor Force Participation 
 
Figure 1.12: Female Labor Force Participation Rates for Select First-Wave Developers, 
1900 and 1960 
 
 
             Source: Olivetti (2013) 
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Chapter 2: Gender Ideology and Fertility Trends in the United States: 
Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As Chapter 1 discusses in length, among the “toolkit” of compelling theories 
explaining low fertility variation is gender equity theory.  Though its roots stem from the 
early work of Sorrentino (1990), Chesnais (1996), and Mason (1995), gender equity 
theory was formally articulated by McDonald at the turn of the 21st century (McDonald 
2000).  McDonald argued that low fertility results from an incoherence of gender equity 
levels in individually oriented social institutions and family-oriented social institutions.  
In other words, in contexts where women are at equal footing with men in educational 
and labor market opportunities, but face an inequitable and overtaxing home 
environment, the combination of work and family is difficult, and as a result, may cause 
some women to postpone or forego finding a permanent partner or establishing a family 
in order to pursue their career aspirations.  Conversely, high levels of gender equity in 
both family and individually oriented institutions facilitate the combination of work and 
family, leading to higher levels of fertility on the country-level.   
In recent years, a string of empirical analyses has sought to shed light on 
McDonald’s theory.  While these analyses use different indicators of gender equity (e.g., 
global gender indices, labor force participation rates, gender attitudes, and the division of 
household labor), they all reach the conclusion that, on the country-level, high gender 
equity is associated with moderately high levels of fertility whereas low levels of gender 
equity correlate with very low fertility (Myrskyla et al. 2011; Myrskyla et al. 2012; 
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Brinton and Lee 2010; Anderson and Kohler 2013).  As a result, some scholars have gone 
so far as to suggest public policy measures to increase gender equity (e.g., Olah 2011; 
Toulemon 2011). 
While high levels of gender equity strongly correlate with moderately high levels 
of fertility among developed countries, contradictory empirical evidence has caused a 
debate whether the relationship between low gender equity and low fertility holds within 
these societies.   For example, investigating this question using data on egalitarian 
attitudes in eight European countries, Puur et al. 2008 found that more egalitarian 
attitudes held by men are linked with higher fertility.  Yet looking at the same countries 
(in addition to several others), but using different methods of analysis, Westoff and 
Higgins (2009) came to the opposite conclusion—that is, male egalitarian attitudes are 
associated with lower fertility.  A more detailed review of this literature is covered in the 
Background section. 
Whereas Chapter 1 focuses on gender-fertility dynamics at the macro-level and 
seeks to explain fertility variation across countries, the aim of the present Chapter is to 
explore gender-fertility dynamics at the micro-level.  One may imagine that the drivers of 
macro-level fertility variation also apply to the micro-level, yet the field of demography 
offers plenty of examples in which discrepancies between the country and individual 
levels exist.  For example, obesity is positively correlated with income on the country-
level (i.e., the richest countries tend to be the most obese); however, within countries, 
obesity has a strong negative correlation with income (i.e., poor individuals are 
disproportionately obese).  This paper is motivated by a growing body of literature with 
unresolved conclusions regarding the micro-level association between gender equity and 
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fertility within developed countries. 
Much of the recent attention on the fertility-gender equity relationship within 
societies has been heavily European focused (e.g., Westoff and Higgins 2009; Philipov 
2008; Miettinen 2011; Goldsheider et al. 2010).  Within the United States, few studies 
have systematically analyzed individuals’ attitudes on gender equity and their 
associations with fertility outcomes.  Of those that have, their evidence remains 
inconclusive at best.  For example, Torr and Short (2004) analyze whether gender 
ideology is associated with the progression to a second birth, but ignore first and third 
birth transitions and fail to link early life-gender attitudes with later-life completed family 
size.  Kaufman (2000) examines whether gender attitudes are associated with fertility 
desires and intentions, yet, presumably due to data limitations, does not investigate 
whether these desires or intentions are predictive of actual fertility outcomes.  
Nonetheless, Kaufman’s results indicate that compared to traditional women, egalitarian 
women are less likely to intend to have a child while for men, the opposite is true 
(Kaufman 2000). 
By means of a new methodological approach using longitudinal data on fertility 
and attitudes on gender equity that span four decades, this paper fills in the gaps in the 
literature on fertility and gender equity in the United States by analyzing whether gender 
equity attitudes (hereinafter referred to as “gender ideologies”) are predictive of 
completed family size (children ever born), and birth progressions from childless to first, 
first to second, and second to third.   This study is unique in that it examines whether 
differences in the gender equity-fertility relationship exist between males and females.   
While attitudes do not necessarily reflect “family-oriented gender equity” (such as 
 
 
 
52 
the division of household labor), behavioral change regarding gender roles is often 
grounded in attitudes that signify the internalization of role responsibility (Perry-Jenkins 
and Crouter 1990; Kaufman 2000).  Additionally, nearly a dozen studies investigating the 
effects of gender ideology on the division of household labor find that both men and 
women’s gender ideology is highly associated with the division of household labor 
(Davis and Greenstein 2009; Cunningham 2005; Hochschild and Machung 1989; Bianchi 
et al. 2000; Kroska 2004; Hu and Kamo 2007; Lavee and Katz 2002; Brayfield 1992; 
Nordenmark and Nyman 2003; Kan 2008). 
The paper is structured as follows.  I first examine the changes in gender 
ideologies in the United States over the second half of the 20th century. Following David 
and Greenstein (2009, p. 89) I define gender ideology as “the underlying concept of an 
individual's level of support for a division of paid work and family responsibilities that is 
based on the notion of separate spheres”.  As the authors note, there are several nuanced 
alternatives in the literature, including “gender role attitudes”, “attitudes about gender”, 
“gender-related attitudes”, and “gender egalitarianism”.  Drawing on a set of questions 
pertaining to gender norms and attitudes asked in the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth in 1979, 1982, 1987, and 2004, respondents’ gender ideologies are classified using 
latent class analysis for each of the respective years.  These classes are used to assess 
attitudinal change over the latter half of the 20th century.  While descriptive, these 
analyses provide insight into temporal changes in gender ideologies in the US. Moreover, 
these gender ideology classes serve as the key independent variable in the subsequent 
analyses.   
 Using the three gender ideology classes, I explore the relationship between gender 
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ideologies and lifetime fertility (children ever born) as well as between gender ideology 
and birth transitions (or parity progressions).  Analyzing both lifetime fertility and parity 
progressions in this study leads us to develop more nuanced insights into the relationships 
between fertility and gender ideology.  On one hand, the analysis using lifetime fertility 
gives us the ability to clearly state fertility differentials in terms of children per woman 
between individuals of different gender ideologies.  On the other hand, the analysis using 
parity progressions as the dependent variable sheds light on the relative odds of 
progressing to having a first, second, and third birth, and whether these differences are 
statistically significant.  Moreover, gender ideologies are fluid and not static over the life 
course; examining the relationship between parity progression and gender ideology has 
the added advantage of allowing for time ordering (whereas lifetime fertility does not). 
2.2 Background 
 
The United States has witnessed a transformation in gender norms over the last 
half-century, giving rise to impressive trends toward more egalitarian behaviors and 
attitudes.  Within the realm of the division of household labor, for example, household 
work for women had been nearly cut in half between 1965 and 2000, but had doubled for 
men during this period (Bianchi et al. 2000; see also, Thornton 1989; Kaufman 2000). 
Using five large-scale social surveys, Thornton and Young-DeMarco (2001) show that 
the trend toward egalitarian attitudes regarding gender equity in the household and female 
labor force participation changed substantially from the 1960s well into the 1990s.  This 
pattern holds true for both men and women, mothers and their children, and among both 
high school students and the population as a whole (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 
2001).  More recent literature suggests that similar attitudinal and behavioral change 
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toward egalitarianism has occurred throughout the 2000s (Bianchi et al. 2006). 
The changing tides of gender norms have been of interest to demographers 
because of the presumed relationship between gender equity and fertility.  Yet opposing 
theoretical frameworks in the literature make it difficult to anticipate whether egalitarian 
gender attitudes would correlate positively or negatively with fertility for men and 
women. For example, more egalitarian gender attitudes among women may boost fertility 
if it translates into greater flexibility for the mother and a reduced work-childrearing 
conflict for spouses (Goldscheider and Waite 1991; Puur et al. 2008).  However, 
traditional ideologies among women may be associated with an expectation to have large 
families, or conversely, egalitarian women may be expected to have either “no families” 
or “new families” (Miettinen et al. 2010; Goldscheider and Waite 1991).  Following the 
classical Beckerian perspective (e.g., Becker 1991), if traditional women specialize in the 
household while men specialize in market work, it is likely that the opportunity costs of 
having and rearing children would be lower among traditional women than egalitarian 
women, leading to higher fertility. 
For men, an egalitarian gender ideology could result in fewer children, as 
egalitarian men likely invest more time and energy in their kids, thus increasing the costs 
of children (Bernhardt and Goldscheider 2006).  On the other hand, with men sharing 
more household and childbearing responsibilities, it may well be that egalitarian men 
“appreciate the benefits of becoming fathers”, making them more likely to want to 
become fathers than traditional men (Bernhardt and Goldscheider 2006, p. 21).  
Egalitarian men may also have more children than traditional men if their contribution in 
the household alleviates the “double burden” of childrearing and working for their 
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spouses (Miettinen et al. 2011).   
The empirical evidence on the relationship between gender ideology and fertility 
relationship is as conflicting as its theoretical underpinnings.  On one hand, numerous 
within-country and cross-national studies have found positive associations between 
traditional gender ideologies and fertility and/or fertility intentions.  For example, using 
the Gender and Generations Survey (GGS), Speder and Kaitany (2009) show that 
traditional gender ideologies significantly correlate with having a second and third child 
for both men and women.  Westoff and Higgins (2009) use the European/World Values 
Survey and find that in all eight selected European countries analyzed, men’s egalitarian 
attitudes were negatively associated with fertility.   
On the other hand, a set of other studies find that egalitarian gender ideology 
correlates with higher fertility (and that traditional gender ideology correlates with lower 
fertility).  For instance, Puur et al. (2008) found that men with egalitarian attitudes had 
higher desired and actual fertility than men with more traditional attitudes. And Tazi-
Preve et al. (2004) show that in Finland, a traditional division of labor was associated 
with a lower probability to want another baby while the inverse was the case for 
egalitarian couples.    
Still other studies yield mixed results by sex, such as Philipov’s (2008) study on 
11 European countries, which found that for women, “modern attitudes” were associated 
with lower intentions to become parents while for men, the opposite was true in several 
countries; Miettinen et al. (2011), who report that egalitarian and traditional attitudes 
among Finnish men increase expected fertility, while for women the impact of gender 
ideology is ambiguous; and Lappegård et al. (2012), who using the GSS for eight 
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European countries, find negative associations between fertility intentions and egalitarian 
attitudes towards gender roles in the public sphere and mothers’ role in the family, yet a 
positive relationship between father’s role in the family and childbearing intentions. 
The conflicting evidence on the relationship between gender ideology and fertility 
may arise from differences in how gender ideology variables are operationalized or in the 
methodological approach taken (Miettinen 2011; Goldscheider et al. 2010).  Moreover, 
individuals’ gender ideologies likely interact with a country’s economic and political 
structure, as well as the country’s “overall tenor of the gender system”, resulting in 
differential effects on fertility outcomes across different settings (Westoff and Higgins 
2009, p. 72).  
The aforementioned literature has focused almost entirely within the European 
context.  As highlighted, few studies have looked at the relationship between fertility and 
gender ideology in the United States.  Among these, gender ideology has not been found 
to be a significant predictor of having a second child (Torr and Short 2004), yet it has 
been found to correlate positively with birth intentions for men and negatively for women 
(Kaufman 2000). 
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to systematically examine 
whether gender ideology is associated with completed family size, and progressions from 
childless to first birth, and from second birth to third birth in the United States.  This two-
pronged methodological approach should reveal more detailed nuances on the gender 
ideology-fertility relationship for both men and women. 
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2.3 Data 
 
 For my analyses, I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, a 
national probability sample sponsored by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  With an initial 
sample size of 12,686 individuals aged 14-22 in 1979, the NLSY79 is one of the richest 
longitudinal datasets in the United States that follows individuals throughout their 
reproductive years.  I examine only individuals who remain in the survey until 2006 
(N=7,654), as all respondents were above age 40 in this year and further childbearing 
among these respondents is rare (Morgan and Rackin 2010). Two subsamples, including 
the military sample (N=1,079) and the economically disadvantaged, nonblack/non-
Hispanic sample (N=1,643) were no longer eligible for interview after 1990.  Thus, about 
77% of the individuals interviewed in 1979 who were eligible for re-interview in 2006 
are retained in the analyzed sample. 
In each analysis, men and women are analyzed separately in order to compare the 
associations between gender ideology and fertility between the sexes.  Despite previous 
concerns about severe underreporting of male births in major surveys, a recent analysis 
suggests that nine-tenths of early births to men in the NLSY went reported (Joyner et al. 
2012).  One should keep this bias in mind for any interpretation of results in this article.  
Table 2.1 highlights key characteristics about the sample used in this paper. 
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Table 2.1 Background characteristics of sample 
 
Background Characteristics 
  Percent % 
Sex    
      Male  48.8 
      Female  51.2 
Race   
      Hispanic  19.5 
      Black  31.1 
      NH-White  49.4 
Both Parents Immigrants (% Yes)  7.7 
Education   
      Less than High School  10.5 
      High School  43.4 
      Some College  24.3 
      College+  21.8 
Lifetime Poverty   
      Zero  55.7 
      One  21.3 
      Two  10.4 
      Three  5.8 
      Four+  6.7 
Region (2006)   
      Northeast  15.5 
      North Central  23.4 
      South  41.6 
      West  19.4 
      Non-Response  1.0 
Marriage   
      Never Married  17.7 
      Married  57.2 
      Separated  5.3 
      Divorced  18.5 
      Widowed  1.4 
N   7,654 
  Source: NLSY 1979. 
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2.4 Methods 
 
First, to construct a gender ideology variable, latent class analysis is performed on 
a set of eight categorical variables related to attitudes on the division of household labor, 
female labor force participation, and the position of women in the domestic sphere.  
These attitudinal questions on gender ideology have been shown in the literature to be 
both reliable and valid measures (David and Greenstein 2009). The eight questions, 
displayed in Table 2.2, were asked in 1979, 1982, 1987, and 2004.   
Table 2.2: Attitudinal questions on gender roles asked in 1979, 1982, 1987 and 2004 
 
Question Abbreviation Responses 
"A woman's place is in the home, not in the office or 
shop." Place in Home 
1-Strongly Agree,           
2-Agree, 3-Disagree,    
4-Strongly Disagree 
"A wife who carries out her full family responsibilities 
doesn't have time for outside employment." 
No Time 
Employment 
1-Strongly Agree,           
2-Agree, 3-Disagree,    
4-Strongly Disagree 
"A working wife feels more useful than one who doesn't 
hold a job." Useful 
1-Strongly Disagree,           
2-Disagree 3-Agree       
4-Strongly Agree 
"The employment of wives leads to more juvenile 
delinquency." Delinquency 
1-Strongly Agree,           
2-Agree, 3-Disagree,    
4-Strongly Disagree 
"Employment of both parents is necessary to keep up with 
the high cost of living." Inflation 
1-Strongly Disagree,           
2-Disagree 3-Agree       
4-Strongly Agree 
"It is much better for everyone concerned if the man is the 
achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the 
home and family." 
Traditional 
Best 
1-Strongly Agree,           
2-Agree, 3-Disagree,    
4-Strongly Disagree 
"Women are much happier if they stay at home and take 
care of their children." Happier 
1-Strongly Agree,           
2-Agree, 3-Disagree,    
4-Strongly Disagree 
"Men should share the work around the house with 
women, such as doing dishes, cleaning, and so forth." Men Share 
1-Strongly Disagree,           
2-Disagree 3-Agree       
4-Strongly Agree 
Source: NLSY 1979.  Note: Response choices have been recoded from their original form so that all 
response options correspond with a similar gender ideology. 
 
Latent class analysis (LCA) serves as a powerful tool that makes the interpretation 
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of related categorical variables straight-forward and applicable in empirical models 
(Linzer and Lewis 2011).  The classes from the LCA are derived by categorizing 
respondents into different gender ideologies based on their responses to the eight gender-
related questions.  The number of classes used is chosen based on a combination of 
theoretical justifications and parsimony measures.  The estimation technique yields two 
important sets of results:  the item response probabilities conditional on class membership 
and the estimated class membership proportions. 
To produce these results, let πjrk represent the probability that class r produces the 
kth outcome on the jth variable, and let pr represent the mixing proportions that provide the 
weights of the weighted sum of the cross-classification tables. After choosing the number 
of classes, pr and πjrk are estimated by maximizing a log likelihood function using the 
expectation maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster et al. 1977). The posterior 
probability that each individual belongs to each class using Bayes formula is then 
estimated. For the analysis I use the poLCA package in R (Linzer and Lewis 2011).  
After running the analysis, individuals were grouped into three gender ideology 
classes and one class for “missing”.  Given the response probabilities conditional on each 
class (results not shown), one could conclude that class 1 members hold more traditional 
views on gender equity, female labor force participation, and gender roles while class 3 
members hold more progressive (or “egalitarian”) views on these matters. Class 2 
members lie somewhere in the middle of the class 1 and class 3.  For the purpose of 
simplicity, we refer to class 1 membership as “traditional”, class 2 membership as 
“median”, and class 3 membership as “progressive”.  Class 4 is reserved for 
individuals who were coded either “missing”, “refused to answer”, “I don’t know” or 
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“question not asked”.  Class 4 represents a very small proportion of total class 
membership (about 3%) and thus does not pose any serious statistical issues in the 
analyses.  Similar models were run using three, five, and six classes; however, the 
Bayesian information criterion and Akaike information criterion fluctuated little between 
these models, and the theoretically intuitive option of four classes (three gender ideology 
classes and one missing class) was chosen.  The choice of three gender ideology classes 
also reflects common practice in the literature on gender ideology and fertility (e.g., 
Lappegard et al. 2012). 
 It should be noted that the latent class analysis treated each respondent at each of 
the four time points as independent (N= 30,616).  Thus, with eight questions and five 
possible responses to each question, the final possible combinations of responses in the 
analysis were well over 1,000,000.   
After computing three distinct gender ideology classes, I examine the relationship 
between lifetime fertility (children ever born) and gender ideology.  There is no 
prevailing methodological convention in the literature on how to treat the dependent 
variable (children ever born) in this analysis.  Some studies employ OLS for its easy-to-
interpret properties (e.g., Ainsworth et al. 1996; Bollen et al. 2002), while others (e.g., 
Nguyen-Dinh 1997; Verwimp and Van Bavel 2005) use Poisson or negative binomial 
regressions because “children ever born” is a count variable.  Given the distribution of 
the data, as well as the fact that the mean (1.99) and variance (variance=2.13) are roughly 
equal—a precondition for the Poisson distribution, I run and base my discussion off of 
Poisson regression analyses.  
The nature of the research question asked in this section—whether gender 
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ideology of an individual affects his or her completed family size—gives rise to an 
obvious modeling challenge; namely, how to account for gender ideology, a time-varying 
independent variable, in a model with completed fertility, a time-invariant outcome.  To 
circumvent this issue, I perform two analyses: one to capture the effect of early life 
gender ideology on completed fertility, and another to capture the effect of “gender 
ideology transitions” on fertility. 
The first analysis estimates a Poisson regression using the 1979 gender ideology 
variable, allowing us to view the association between early-life gender ideology and 
completed family size.   
For the second analysis, I create a new variable by concatenating respondents’ 
gender ideology in 1979, 1987 and 2004, yielding 27 distinct “gender ideology 
trajectories” (“missing” classes were not included, yielding slightly smaller sample sizes 
than in the first analysis). For example, individuals falling into the traditional class for all 
three waves (1979, 1987, and 2004) would be coded tradtradtrad; 
tradmedianprog would include respondents who belonged in the traditional class in 
1979 but switched to the median class in 1987 and then again to the progressive class in 
2004; and tradmedmed would be for those who transitioned from traditional in 1979 
to median in 1987 and remained in the median category.  I exclude the 1982 category for 
several reasons: 1) the least class membership changed between 1979 and 1982, and 2) 
concatenating all four years would yield an overwhelming number of reference categories 
(81 “gender ideology trajectories”, as opposed to 27).  The gender ideology trajectory 
reference category in the analyses is “consistently traditional” individuals (i.e., 
tradtradtrad).  Only statistically significant gender ideology trajectories for either 
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men or women are reported. 
Significant socioeconomic, racial, marital, educational, and to a lesser extent, 
geographic variation in fertility levels exists in the United States (Yang and Morgan 
2003; Fosler et al. 1990).   While the purpose of this study is not to examine the impact of 
these variables on fertility outcomes, it is important to control for these possible 
confounders.  Two variables are used to control for socioeconomic status, lifetime 
poverty, a dummy variable measuring the number of occasions respondents reported 
living in poverty from 1979 to 2006 (zero-reference, one, two, three, four or more), and a 
dummy variable for education (Less than High School, High School Completed-
reference, Some College, College or higher).  Region of residence in 200627 (Northeast-
reference, North Central, South, West), race (Hispanic, Black, Non-Hispanic/Non-Black-
reference), marital status in 2006 (never married, married-reference, separated, divorced, 
widowed), and immigrant status (1 if parents were born outside of the US, 0 if not) are 
included to control for regional, racial, marital, and immigrant fertility variation.  Year of 
birth is also controlled for in the model to capture any fertility variation by cohort year, 
although this is not anticipated given the fact that cohort fertility in the United States 
changed very little from 1957-1965 (Myrsykla et al. 2012).  Lastly, on theoretical 
grounds that egalitarian men and women could differ in their fertility, I run separate 
models by sex.  Because region is a time-varying covariate, I run separate models with 
region of residence in 1979 and 1987; these models yield almost identical results. 
To test whether gender ideologies are associated with birth progressions, discrete 
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time-survival models are run for each of the three birth transitions (childless to first birth, 
first birth to second birth, and second birth to third birth).  The data were set up using 
event history techniques in order to overcome several limitations involved with 
traditional logistic regression.  Among these limitations is the inability to control for 
time-varying covariates, including our key independent variable—gender ideology. 
Because some of our respondents changed their gender ideology over the various waves, 
it is important to capture whether those ideologies affected the likelihood of having a 
birth during the same time interval.  Other covariates, including region of residence, 
marital status, and education also may have varied for individuals throughout the survey.   
 Like in the analyses with children ever born as the dependent variable, a number 
of control variables are implemented to hold constant possible confounders.  To control 
for socioeconomic status and educational attainment, total family income (continuous 
variables) and education (Less than High School, High School-reference, Some College, 
College or higher) are included in the models (note: lifetime poverty is not measured).  
Region (Northeast-reference, North Central, South, West), race (Hispanic, Black, Non-
Hispanic/Non-Black-reference), marital status (never married-reference, married, 
separated, divorced, widowed), and immigrant status (1 if both parents were born outside 
of the US, 0 if not) are retained in the model, though I allow marital status and region to 
vary.   
2.5 Results 
 
 As the LCA results below indicate, in 1979, about 19% of individuals in the 
sample belonged to the “progressive” class, 50% to the median, and 30% to the 
“traditional” class.  By 2004, these numbers had reversed; that is, the median retained 
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nearly half of the individuals while the progressive class nearly doubled to around 31% 
and the traditional class halved to around 15%.  
 
Table 2.3: LCA Results:  Gender ideology class membership by survey year 
 
 1979 1982 1987 2004 
Traditional 32.0% 21.5% 14.8% 15.1% 
Median 48.5% 51.8% 50.2% 47.4% 
Progressive 19.3% 24.3% 30.3% 31.4% 
Missing 0.2% 2.4% 4.8% 6.2% 
Source: Author’s own calculation from attitudinal data from NLSY 1979. 
Stratifying the gender ideology classes by sex (Figure 2.1) indicates that the 
declines in “traditional” class membership have been driven by both men and women 
identifying less with traditional gender attitudes; by 2004, roughly an equal proportion of 
women belonged in this class as men.  The “progressive” classes for both men and 
women experienced similar absolute increases over time, with the most change occurring 
between 1979 and 1987.  While the sample size as a whole became more progressive in 
their attitudes toward gender equity, there remains a large gender gap between men and 
women.  
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Figure 2.1: Traditional and progressive classes, by sex 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation from attitudinal data from NLSY 1979.  Note: “Median” individuals not shown. 
 The LCA results corroborate the large literature documenting that individuals 
have adopted more progressive (or “egalitarian”) gender attitudes over the latter half of 
the 20th century (Bianchi et al. 2000; Thornton 1989; Kaufman 2000; Thornton and 
Young-DeMarco 2001).   
The results for the first analysis looking at the association between early-life 
gender ideology and completed fertility, illustrated in Table 2.4, finds that progressive 
women in 1979 have slightly smaller family sizes (about 10%) than traditional women.  
The model suggests no significant differences between traditional women and “median” 
women (using the 1979 gender variable); nor does completed fertility for traditional 
(1979) men and their progressive or median counterparts for that same year appear to 
differ. 
The Poisson regression results for the second analysis, displayed in Table 2.5, 
indicate that gender ideology is significantly associated with fertility outcomes.  The 
evidence is much stronger for women, for whom many variants of “progressive” and 
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“median” gender ideology trajectories are associated with much lower fertility compared 
to “traditional” gender ideology.  Specifically, compared with consistently traditional 
women (tradtradtrad), consistently progressive women have a 25% smaller family 
size.  Controlling for all other covariates, consistently median women had a 13% smaller 
family size than their consistently traditional counterparts.  For men, consistently 
progressive males had much lower fertility than their traditional counterparts (around 
20% lower completed fertility).  The only other statistically significant gender ideology 
trajectory for men was tradmedmed (i.e., men who became less traditional from 
baseline had fewer kids than those who remained traditional). 
It is worth noting that socioeconomic status, race, and marital status all yielded 
significant results.  As expected, controlling for all other variables, low socioeconomic 
status, being Hispanic and Black, and low educational attainment are associated with 
greater fertility for both men and women.  Immigrant status and year born did not yield 
significant coefficients, and region was only weakly significant for females. 
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Table 2.4:  Poisson regression results:  Completed family size on 1979 gender ideology and 
other covariates 
 Female (N=3885) Male (N=3691) 
 Coeff. Sig. S.E. Coeff. Sig. S.E. 
Gender Ideology                 
(ref. = Traditional)       
Median -0.03  0.03 -0.01  0.03 
Missing -0.41  0.33 -0.34  0.25 
Progressive -0.09 ** 0.03 -0.06  0.04 
Race (ref. = NH-White)       
Hispanic 0.12 *** 0.03 0.25 *** 0.04 
Black 0.13 *** 0.03 0.30 *** 0.03 
Lifetime Poverty (ref. = 
Zero)       
One 0.09 ** 0.03 0.04  0.03 
Two 0.26 *** 0.04 0.20 *** 0.04 
Three 0.34 *** 0.05 0.28 *** 0.06 
Four+ 0.61 *** 0.04 0.25 *** 0.06 
Educational Attainment    
(ref. = High School)       
Less than High School 0.12 ** 0.04 0.01  0.04 
Some college -0.03  0.03 -0.06  0.03 
College -0.19 *** 0.03 -0.12 ** 0.03 
Region (ref. = Northeast)       
North Central 0.12 ** 0.04 0.05  0.04 
South -0.05  0.03 -0.07  0.04 
West 0.05  0.04 0.00  0.04 
Marital Status                    
(ref. = Married)       
Never Married -0.64 *** 0.04 -0.93 *** 0.04 
Separated -0.11 * 0.04 -0.06  0.06 
Divorced -0.17 *** 0.03 -0.17 *** 0.03 
Widowed -0.24 ** 0.08 -0.42 ** 0.15 
Immigrant Parents 0.04  0.05 0.04  0.05 
Constant 0.79 *** 0.08 0.67 *** 0.08 
Source: NLSY 1979.  Note: Cohort coefficients were small and insignificant and thus not reported.   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 2.5: Poisson regression results:  Completed family size on gender ideology trajectories 
and other covariates  
 Female (N=3599) Male (N=3208) 
 Coeff. Sig. S.E. Coeff. Sig. S.E. 
Gender Ideology                   
(ref. = tradtradtrad)       
medmedmed -0.14 * 0.07 -0.07  0.06 
medmedprog -0.16 * 0.07 -0.09  0.07 
medprogmed -0.27 ** 0.08 -0.09  0.08 
medprogprog -0.18 * 0.07 -0.13  0.08 
tradmedmed -0.10  0.07 -0.13 * 0.06 
progmedmed -0.19 * 0.08 -0.17  0.11 
progprogmed -0.18 * 0.09 0.04  0.11 
progprogprog -0.30 *** 0.07 -0.19 * 0.10 
Race (ref. = NH-White)       
Hispanic 0.13 *** 0.04 0.24 *** 0.04 
Black 0.14 *** 0.03 0.31 *** 0.03 
Lifetime Poverty (ref. = Zero)       
One 0.10 ** 0.03 0.06  0.03 
Two 0.25 *** 0.04 0.22 *** 0.05 
Three 0.33 *** 0.05 0.33 *** 0.06 
Four+ 0.62 *** 0.04 0.33 *** 0.07 
Educational Attainment      
(ref. = High School)       
Less than High School 0.10 * 0.04 -0.01  0.04 
Some college -0.02  0.03 -0.05  0.03 
College -0.17 *** 0.03 -0.11 ** 0.04 
Region (ref. = North East)       
North Central 0.12 ** 0.04 0.05  0.04 
South -0.05  0.04 -0.07  0.04 
West 0.05  0.04 0.00  0.04 
Marital Status (ref. = Married)       
Never Married -0.65 *** 0.04 -0.91 *** 0.05 
Separated -0.10 * 0.05 -0.06  0.06 
Divorced -0.18 *** 0.03 -0.13 *** 0.04 
Widowed -0.27 ** 0.08 -0.47 ** 0.17 
Immigrant Parents 0.01  0.05 0.05  0.05 
Constant 0.87 *** 0.10 0.70 *** 0.10 
Source: NLSY 1979.  Note: Only statistically significant gender ideology trajectories for at least one sex 
reported in output.  Gender ideologies represent class membership change from 197919872004.  For 
example, an individual who moves from progressive (in 1979) to median (in 1987) to traditional (in 2004) 
would be coded “progmedtrad”. Cohort coefficients were small and insignificant and thus not 
reported.   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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After estimating the second analysis (Table 2.5), predicted values for children 
ever born were estimated for each individual based on their gender ideology trajectory 
and controlling for all covariates.  
Figure 2.2 below illustrates average fertility levels for groups of varying levels of 
“progressiveness”.  “Consistently Progressive” refers to individuals who belonged to the 
progressive class in 1979, 1987, and 2004 (e.g., progprogprog).  “Two Progressive” 
denotes a group of individuals who fall into any gender ideology trajectories with exactly 
two progressive categories (e.g., progmedprog, medprogprog, etc.). “One 
Progressive” is constituted of individuals in a gender ideology trajectory of only one 
progressive class (e.g., progmedmed, medprogmed, etc.).  Individuals who 
never belonged to a progressive class (e.g., medmedmed; tradtradmed, etc.) are 
classified  “Never Progressive”.   
Figure 2.2 shows steep gradients for both men and women by progressiveness.  
For women, statistically significant fertility levels between all four groups exist, with 
“consistently progressive” individuals having an average of 1.59 children—well below 
the replacement rate of 2.05—and “never progressive” females having an average of 
nearly 2.2.  For men, fertility ranges from 1.88 for “consistently progressive” males to 2.3 
children for “never progressive” males.  
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Figure 2.2: Male and Female Completed Fertility Gradients by “Progressiveness” 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations from NLSY 1979.  Notes:  Number of individuals belonging to each 
group above each point.  Stars represent significance levels between two groups.  “All Progressive” refers 
to individuals who belonged to progressive class in 1979, 1987, and 2004 (e.g., progprogprog); “Two 
Progressive” denotes a group of individuals in gender ideology trajectories with exactly two progressive 
categories (e.g., progmedprog, medprogprog, etc.); “One Progressive” classifies individuals in 
a gender ideology trajectory of only one progressive class (e.g., progmedmed, medprogmed, 
etc.); and “Never Progressive” includes individuals who never belonged to progressive class (e.g., 
medmedmed; tradtradmed, etc.). 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 The output for the third analysis, which analyzes the relationship between three 
birth transitions and gender ideology, is found in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 (for males and 
females, respectively).   
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Table 2.6: Male birth progressions estimated using discrete-time models  
                              Male Birth Progressions 
 Childless to First First to Second Second to Third 
Start 1.07*                      
(.016) 
1.24***                                     
(.015) 
1.33***                                      
(.024) 
Year Born 0.99                       
(.016) 
1.1***                                 
(.014) 
1.07***                                         
(.02) 
Gender Ideology (ref. = Traditional)    
Median .89                               
(.068) 
.96                                        
(.07) 
.86                                          
(.08) 
Missing/Unknown .4148                       
(.31) 
.46                                       
(.26) 
.18                                           
(.19) 
Progressive 0.76**                        
(.08) 
1                                      
(.09) 
.9                                          
(.10) 
Race  (ref. = NH-White)    
Hispanic 1.6***                            
(.16)         
1.03                                  
(.09) 
1.66***                                         
(.18) 
Black 2.8***                          
(.23) 
1.18**                               
(.08) 
2***                                           
(.17) 
Region (ref = North East)    
North Central 1                             
(.10) 
.98                                   
(.08) 
1.2                                         
(.11) 
South 0.93                        
(.09) 
.96                                
(.08) 
.82                                        
(.09) 
West 1.07                          
(.15) 
1.2                                     
(.1) 
1.1                                          
(.13) 
Marital Status  
(ref. = Never Married)    
Married 11.83***                     
(.96) 
2.69***                                  
(.18) 
2.85***                                        
(.24) 
Separated 7.93***                     
(1.49) 
1.94***                                
(.36) 
3.25***                                       
(.65) 
Divorced 3.86***                      
(.68) 
1.32                              
(.21) 
3.55***                                       
(.59) 
Widowed 1.4                         
(1.52) 
1.1                                      
(.92) 
2.71                                        
(2.36) 
Education (ref. = High School)    
Less than HS 1.48*                       
(.23) 
1.66***                                   
(.24) 
1.16                                          
(.3) 
Some College 0.99                          
(.18) 
1.75***                                  
(.26) 
1.59                                    
(.38) 
College+ 1.94***                        
(.26) 
2.66***                                
(.33) 
2.38                                       
(.49) 
Income 1***                       
(2.13e-06) 
1                                
(1.47e-06) 
1                                            
(1.94e-06) 
Immigrant Status 0.85                         
(.12) 
1.22                                
(.13) 
1.15                                        
(.16) 
 Source: NLSY 1979. 
 *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 2.7: Female birth progressions estimated using discrete-time models 
                     Female Birth Progressions 
 Childless to First First to Second Second to Third 
Start .99                              
(.011) 
1.09***                                     
(.013) 
1.19***                                 
(.017) 
Year Born 1.01                           
(.013) 
1.1***                                 
(.013) 
1.09***                              
(.017) 
Gender Ideology (ref. = Traditional)    
Median .89                               
(.061) 
.95                                        
(.07) 
.72***                                          
(.06) 
Missing/Unknown 1.07                       
(.57) 
.1.13                                       
(.56) 
2.06                                    
(1.05) 
Progressive 0.71***                        
(.05) 
.9                                      
(.07) 
.61***                                              
(.06) 
Race  (ref. = NH-White)    
Hispanic 1.5***                            
(.12)         
1.1                                  
(.08) 
1.63***                                         
(.16) 
Black 2.4***                          
(.16) 
1.2**                               
(.07) 
1.96***                                           
(.16) 
Region (ref = North East)    
North Central 1.15                             
(.10) 
1.11                                   
(.08) 
1.2                                         
(.12) 
South 0.93                        
(.09) 
.93                                
(.07) 
.81*                                      
(.08) 
West 1.08                          
(.10) 
1                                     
(.08) 
.89                                       
(.10) 
Marital Status  
(ref. = Never Married)    
Married 7.57***                     
(.50) 
2.66***                                  
(.16) 
3.16***                                        
(.25) 
Separated 4.42***                     
(.57) 
1.53**                                
(.21) 
2.22***                                       
(.36) 
Divorced 2.79***                      
(.37) 
1.51**                              
(.18) 
2.58***                                       
(.37) 
Widowed 2.85*                         
(1.48) 
.81                                      
(.46) 
1.28                                        
(.81) 
Education (ref. = High School)    
Less than HS 1.02                       
(.23) 
1.61***                                   
(.17) 
.94                                          
(.18) 
Some College 0.56***                          
(.18) 
1.32**                                  
(.16) 
1.09                                    
(.20) 
College+ 1                               
(.1) 
2.23***                                
(.22) 
1.955                                       
(.29) 
Income 1***                       
(1.83e-06) 
1                                
(1.48e-06) 
1                                            
(1.97e-06) 
Immigrant Status 0.75*                         
(.08) 
1.22                                
(.11) 
1.11                                        
(.14) 
 Source: NLSY 1979. 
 *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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The results, illustrated in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, suggest that, controlling for 
socioeconomic, regional, and demographic variables, gender ideologies are associated 
with the transitions from childlessness to first birth and from second birth to third birth 
for women.  Compared to women holding a “progressive” gender ideology, females with 
a “traditional” gender ideology had 1.41 higher odds of having a first birth.  No statistical 
difference between traditional and “median” women existed for this first transition.  
Furthermore, the model suggests that among women who already had one child, gender 
ideology did not influence a woman’s probability of having a second child.  Yet for 
women who had two children, gender ideology was found to be an important predictor of 
going on to have a third birth.  Specifically, compared to women with “progressive” and 
“median” ideologies, women with a traditional gender ideology had 1.64 and 1.72 higher 
odds, respectively, of transitioning from second birth to third birth.   
 For men, the statistical evidence that gender ideology influences birth 
progressions is scant.  Among the three transition models, the only statistically significant 
ideology coefficient was that of progressive childless men, who had a .76 lower odds of 
ever having a child compared to traditionally-thinking men.   In other words, men with a 
traditional gender ideology had 1.35 higher odds of having a first birth than men with a 
progressive gender ideology.   
 These results mirror Torr and Short’s findings that gender ideology does not 
influence the probability for individuals to have a second birth.  The stigma against 
single-child families may explain why this is the case: individuals who have one child, 
regardless of their gender ideology, likely felt pressure to give that child a sibling.   
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2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This paper takes a new methodological approach using a rich longitudinal dataset 
to confirm previous findings in the literature on attitudinal change regarding gender 
norms in the United States over the latter half of the 20th century.  
 Using three gender ideology classes, the paper finds that gender ideology is 
highly correlated with fertility outcomes in the United States. Both men and women with 
progressive views on gender equity have lower fertility than respondents with traditional 
views, though these conclusions were stronger, more consistent, and more significant 
across models for women.  Progressions from childless to first birth, and from second to 
third birth were significantly associated with gender ideology for women, with 
progressive female respondents having much lower odds of making these transitions than 
their traditional counterparts.  For men, with the exception of progressive men having 
lower odds of having a first birth than traditional men, there was little evidence that 
gender ideology is associated with the propensity to have a second or third birth.  
 The United States joins a number of other developed countries that have relatively 
high levels of family-oriented gender equity and relatively high fertility.  Macro-level 
analyses generally accept that these two variables are causally related, as greater gender 
equity allows women to pursue their desired fertility while maintaining their career 
aspirations.  Yet the present study documents a striking inconsistency to this logic, as it 
finds that the United States’ relatively high fertility rate is driven by traditional women 
who have much higher fertility than their gender egalitarian counterparts.  One possible 
reason for this micro/macro discrepancy is that the overall economic and institutional 
structure of the United States may promote higher fertility among women of all gender 
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ideologies.  In other words, the gender equity “tide” may increase or decrease the fertility 
of all gender ideology groups.  This hypothesis may also explain other macro/micro 
inconsistencies in fertility research, such the positive correlation between fertility and 
female labor force participation on the country-level (Kohler et al. 2002) and the negative 
correlation between these two variables on the micro-level (Hakim 2003).  
In addition to this discrepancy, a number of limitations to this study should be 
highlighted.  First, while a strong theoretical justification can be made as to why gender 
ideology would influence fertility behavior, having a child could plausibly cause one to 
change his or her gender ideology.  Using the 1979 gender ideology variable in the first 
analysis (i.e., Table 2.4) lends credence to the argument that gender ideology does indeed 
influence completed fertility, as the majority of the sample (above 95%) had never given 
birth in this year. Nonetheless, examining the effect of having a birth on gender ideology, 
and more broadly, elucidating the correlates of gender ideology change, could provide 
insight into whether bidirectional causation exists in the gender ideology-fertility 
relationship. 
In a similar spirit, a second limitation is that this paper does not account for the 
possible effects of religiosity on gender ideology.  It is likely that the related familial, 
community, and institutional components of religion shape one’s gender ideology. 
Appendix I lends support to the idea that religiosity and gender ideology are closely 
linked by showing the relationship between traditional/progressive class membership and 
two measures of religiosity, religious affiliation and religious attendance.  These four 
graphs illustrate striking differences in gender ideology on both measures of religiosity.  
They also show a temporal reversal in class membership whereby individuals of all 
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religious denominations have become less traditional over time. An important next step 
in investigating the gender ideology and fertility relationship in the United States should 
consider the role of religion in shaping these processes.  Incorporating religion in cross-
national comparisons of the fertility-gender ideology relationship may also benefit the 
literature by highlighting a potentially unique pathway to relatively high fertility in the 
United States. 
A third limitation is that this study omits variables related to childcare support and 
labor force participation.  It is likely that individuals—especially progressive women—
with strong support networks, financial access to childcare, and flexible work 
arrangements have higher fertility than those without these work-family facilitators. 
The final limitation of this study is that, because we do not have data on 
respondents’ spouses, we are examining individuals “in a vacuum”, outside of their 
spousal context.  There is likely an interaction effect between the gender ideologies of 
spouses such that discordant ideologies (i.e., traditional husband and progressive wife) 
would likely result in much different fertility outcomes than concordant ideologies (i.e., 
both traditional husband and wife). 
 Future research would benefit from considering these limitations. Furthermore, 
integrating more recent data with younger birth cohorts may indicate whether the 
relationships elucidated in this paper change across temporal contexts.  As the individuals 
of the NLSY spin-off datasets (the “NLSY Children and Young Adults” and the “NLSY 
1997”) reach the end of their childbearing years, replications of this study would provide 
insight as to whether differential fertility outcomes by gender ideology are fixed and 
persistent over time. 
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2.7 Appendix I: Religion and Gender Ideology 
Figures 2.3-2.6: Gender Ideology and Two Dimensions of Religiosity in 1979-1982 and 2000-2004 
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Chapter 3: Shadow Education and the Quality-Quantity Tradeoff in the 
21st Century 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In 1986, the Population Council dedicated Volume 12 of its flagship journal, 
Population and Development Review, to “the causes and consequences of the recent 
scarcity of births in industrial countries” (Davis et al. 1986, p. ix).  The journal featured a 
series of articles by some of the century’s most eminent demographers in hopes of giving 
the phenomenon of low fertility more scholarly attention, with respect to underlying 
causes, trends and long-term implications. Ansley Coale delved into the demographic 
effects of below-replacement fertility, Gary Becker developed a model of altruism and 
the economic theory of fertility, Sam Preston covered the interplay between changing 
values and falling fertility, Ronald Lee elaborated on the value and allocation of time and 
its implications for fertility, Paul Demeny showcased the importance of policies 
surrounding low fertility, and Kingsley Davis and Nathan Keyfitz each gave broad-brush 
accounts of low fertility from various disciplinary perspectives.  While their contributions 
summarized and innovatively developed economic, sociological, and hybrid approaches 
to understanding fertility declines in industrial countries, only one - by Shigemi Kono - 
tied low fertility rates to the rising costs of childrearing induced by educational pressures. 
Kono’s elaboration on the social landscape of Japan placed emphasis on the 
country’s scarcity of resources and Confucian-inspired work ethic.  In turn, according to 
Kono, these variables have turned Japan into a fiercely competitive society in which the 
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psychological and monetary costs of children drive down the country’s low fertility rate.  
Kono (1986, p.171) writes: 
In a resource-scarce but advanced society, fierce competition permeates every corner of 
life…[r]igorous entrance examinations for ranking universities and for large and 
prestigious corporations become common.  Demographic responses to such an 
environment are to delay marriage and reduce family size. 
Kono continues, observing that: 
Severe and ruthless examinations [have] become the style of life in Japan. […] In order to 
get into a good university, one has to enter a good senior high school, and to get into a 
good senior high school, one has to enter a good junior high, and so on.  In Tokyo at 
10:30 P.M. on Friday, suburban trains are filled with primary school pupils aged around 
10 who are just returning from well-known juku (after-school cram sessions). 
In a governmental poll Kono cites, the three most frequent answers from Japanese 
couples aged 20-35 as to why they did not attempt to realize their ideal family size were 
1) cost of education is too high; 2) raising children requires a lot of money; and 3) raising 
children imposes heavy physical and psychological burdens (Atoh et al. 1983; Kono 
1986).  Kono’s contribution was important because it shed light on a distinctive fertility-
reducing social force Japan possessed that Western Europe did not – a strong and 
omnipresent quality-quantity tradeoff that permeated all social and economic strata, 
motivated in part by the economic burden of raising competitive children in an 
increasingly competitive environment. 
The “quality-quantity” tradeoff can be tied back to Arsene Dumont (1890), who 
argued that parents limit their family size because children hinder their path to success 
and achievement.  Dumont contented that the same holds true for those who would like to 
“project their ambitions onto their children,” as more offspring translates into fewer 
resources to be dispersed among the children (Van Bavel 2006).  Numerous others, 
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including Banks (1954), Becker (1960), Aries (1980), and Dalla Zuanna (2007) have 
written extensively about the active effort of parents to limit their fertility in order to 
pincrease the “quality” of those children.  
A separate literature largely ignored by demographers deals with the relatively 
recent and widespread phenomenon of “shadow education”, defined by Baker et al. 
(2001) as “outside-school learning activities paralleling features of formal schooling used 
by students to increase their own educational opportunities.” Shadow education is 
concerned with mathematics, languages, sciences, and other school-related subjects—not 
supplementary learning through offerings like Sunday School, choir or ballet, or Boy 
Scouts (Bray 2011).  In a seminal study, Bray (1999) dispels the belief that shadow 
education is a wealthy East Asian phenomenon, and sheds light on shadow education’s 
global presence in high, medium, and low income countries.28 
This is the first paper to bridge the literatures on shadow education and fertility 
and to empirically investigate the relationship between shadow education and fertility 
within a cross-national framework.  I begin by reviewing the literature on shadow 
education and the quality-quantity tradeoff.  Next, I use data representing 42 below-
replacement fertility countries to explore the country-level association between shadow 
education rates and fertility.  Finally, I explore the individual level relationship between 
                                                          
28 Bray et al. claim that a decade after Bray’s 1999 article, “private tutoring had become recognized as a 
world-wide phenomenon that transcended geographic and national boundaries, as well as social class 
boundaries, with both policy makers and researchers beginning to look at the phenomenon more closely” 
(Bray et al. 2013, p. 2). 
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educational expenditures and fertility in 12 geographically, culturally, and economically 
diverse countries.  
From the macro-level analysis, after controlling for HDI, I find that shadow 
education rates are negatively associated with country-level TFRs.  The within-country 
analyses reveal that educational expenditures are negatively associated with fertility in 
most of the Latin American, Southern & Eastern European, East Asian, and Middle 
Eastern countries.  Consistent with the hypothesis that the quality-quantity trade-off is 
much less present in Western countries, I find little relationship between individual-level 
educational expenditures and fertility in the Western countries in the sample (with the 
exception of Denmark).  
3.2 Background 
 
Shadow Education 
From Brazil to Korea, Taiwan to Zimbabwe, and Russia to India, private tutoring 
(or “shadow education”) has swept the world by storm over the last three decades (Mori 
and Baker 2010; Dang and Rogers 2008; Bray 1999; Baker et al. 2001).  Shadow 
education rates vary greatly across countries, though in many places around the world, 
more than 40% of 15 year olds attend a private cram school (see Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2 
below).  The ubiquity of shadow education has had rippling effects on many countries’ 
educational landscapes, driving educational and social inequalities and perpetuating a 
culture of competitiveness (Silova et al. 2006; Bray 1999; Bray and Lykins 2012).  It has 
also become a large financial burden for parents who feel it necessary to send their 
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children to supplementary private tutoring sessions (Mori and Baker 2010; Bray and 
Lykins 2012).  
If a high prevalence of shadow education raises the anticipated costs of having 
children to the point where it reduces fertility – as I argue in this paper – then having a 
clear grasp of the causes of shadow education is important for understanding 
heterogeneity in fertility rates.  This section provides a summary of the literature on the 
causes of shadow education across countries. 
1. School Quality 
Parental dissatisfaction with educational systems serves as a major driver of 
private tutoring in middle and low-income countries (Dang and Rogers 2008; Bray and 
Lykins 2012).  Inadequacies come in many forms, such as teachers failing to show up to 
school, students finding difficulty in understanding what was taught in class, not learning 
the necessary content for benchmark exams, or large classes that are perceived to be 
disadvantageous (Dawson 2010; Bray and Lykins 2012).  In places where state run 
schools are viewed as incompetent, parents not only provide their children with private 
tutoring to give them an extra “leg up”, but also to ensure that their children learn basic 
skills and concepts (Bray and Lykins 2012). 
In more developed countries, dissatisfaction with state-run educational systems 
does not serve as a sufficient explanation for heterogeneity in shadow education rates.  
Korea and Greece, for example, have well-funded and well-staffed school systems but 
also very high rates of shadow education while Finland and Sweden also have well-
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funded educational systems but low rates of private tutoring (Bray 1999).  Thus, one must 
dig deeper to explain cross-country differences in shadow education rates. 
2. Longstanding Cultural Emphasis on Education 
East Asian countries, including China, Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Taiwan, are dominated by centuries old Confucian values that stress the importance of 
learning, effort, and various forms of competition (Bray 2010; see also Rohlen and 
LeTendre 1996; Salili 2005).  Moreover, the Confucian-related act of filial piety 
(respecting one’s parents and relatives) lives concomitantly with an assumed duty on the 
parents to provide their children with the tools and resources to succeed. 
3. Economic Shocks 
Abrupt economic shocks foment an environment of employment uncertainty, 
which in turn makes the returns of a top-tier education more valuable. This explanation is 
best suited for Eastern Europe, where the sweeping social, economic, and political 
transformations of the early 1990s brought about financial insecurity and increased 
competition in the labor market (Kubánová 2006).  In response to these rapid changes, 
private tutoring and sending one’s children abroad were used as primary strategies for 
building the family’s capital (Murawska and Pukiewicz 2006).  Furthermore, over the 
past two decades the returns on higher education have increased enormously in the region 
(Kubánova 2006), perpetuating “a necessity” for private tutoring and causing enrollment 
rates in higher education to double or triple in many Eastern European countries (Silova 
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2010).29  On the supply side, teachers who remained in government schools post-
socialism were given inadequate salaries and were forced to supplement their income 
with private tutoring (Bray 2010; Bray 2011). Moreover, pressure from schoolteachers 
has contributed to an environment in which students feel they would be disadvantaged if 
they do not pay their teachers for private tutoring  (Silova et al., p. 14).  It should be 
noted that Africa resembles Eastern Europe in that teachers are increasingly seeing 
shadow education as a way of supplementing their incomes while parents see it as a 
mechanism of social mobility for their offspring (Bray and Suso 2008).   
In East Asia, the economic crisis of 1997 is commonly noted for having 
intensified the competitive environment (Eun 2007; Park 2009).  Discussing the climate 
in Korea, Eun (2007, p. 7) notes that “uncertainty was endemic” and distinguishing 
oneself from others was a necessity in order to receive the best university education and 
later, a high-paying and secure job. 
4. Socioeconomic and Institutional Inequalities 
While a nascent body of literature on shadow education and inequality argues that 
private tutoring exacerbates socioeconomic inequalities (Dawson 2010; Bray 2009), 
socioeconomic inequalities may contribute to the demand for shadow education.  In a 
highly stratified society in which income differentials between the most and least 
educated are large, the incentive to provide one’s children with private tutoring is 
                                                          
29 Private tutoring has become so widespread in parts of Eastern Europe that it has become a contentious 
political topic in some countries.  For example, the Minister of Education and Sport in Poland was quoted in 
2005 for saying that in his country only “students at small rural schools” do not partake in private tutoring 
(Murawska and Pikiewicz 2006) 
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presumably greater than in a society in which the income gap between the most and least 
educated is small.  After all, if parents can be sure that their offspring will have access to 
a livable wage – regardless of their eventual educational attainment – it is logical to 
presume that they will not pursue costly private education as fervently as parents in 
countries where educational status, often singlehandedly, is perceived to determine one’s 
income and quality of life.  Along similar lines, one could suspect shadow education rates 
to be lower in countries where social support systems ensure access to quality health care, 
higher education, and generous old age pensions to all individuals, regardless of 
educational background. 
One would also expect greater shadow education rates in countries where the 
social and financial returns to a degree from an “elite” institution are high. For years this 
has held true in the US and UK, where the perceived benefits of an “Ivy League” or 
“Oxbridge” education has long driven fierce competition among high school students for 
admission into one of these institutions.  Yet in many countries now, long-standing 
efforts to promote egalitarianism in higher education have been undermined by the 
creation of branded academic unions similar to the Ivy League and Oxbridge.  
Governments and universities alike, in an attempt to create more globally attractive and 
competitive institutions, have invariably created stratified hierarchies of academic 
prestige.  Notable elite academic groups include China’s “G9 League,” Germany’s 
“Excellence Initiative Universities,” Australia’s “Group of Eight,” and Korea’s “SKY”.30  
                                                          
30 There is great variation in the presumed “prestige” of these academic groups.  For example, despite 
Germany’s “Excellence Initiative,” the German higher education playing field remains much more equal than 
in Korea, where attending an elite university can greatly influence one’s earnings and social position (Card 
2005). 
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Given their prestigious brand, studying at a university belonging to one of these groups is 
presumed to lead to greater social mobility and higher returns on one’s time, efforts, and 
money.  Discussing Japan, Kono (1986, p. 172) writes: 
[An] important factor conducive to low fertility in Japan is the exceedingly rigorous competition 
for admission to ranking schools such as the University of Tokyo.  It is an ordeal not only for the 
applicants but also for their families.  The advantages of success are great, the costs of failure 
severe.  One lucky enough to gain acceptance to a prestigious school wears a badge of honor for 
the rest of his life.  A graduate of a ranking university is usually promoted faster than others and 
benefits professionally from membership in a network of alumni who hold key positions in 
government and business.  Sometimes, prestigious corporations send notices of job openings only 
to ranking universities. 
And within the context of Korea, McDonald (2011) asserts that: 
The ultimate goal for most students is acceptance at one of the so-called SKY schools — Seoul 
National, Korea or Yonsei universities. In South Korea’s status-conscious society, a degree from a 
SKY school is nearly a guarantee of a big career and lifelong prosperity. Pedigree is everything. 
 “Institutional inequalities” are also driven by national and world university 
rankings (Marginson 2005). That the world has become rank-obsessed can be evidenced 
by the fact that before 2003, there were no annually published global ranking lists; today 
there are over fifteen (see Hazelkorn 2012).31 Millions of students around the globe 
eagerly await the release of annual national and international ranking tables, and use such 
“tools” to guide their university selection choices (Dill and Soo 2005; Dill 2006).  As the 
gap between the highly, mediocrely, and low ranked universities becomes more heavily 
emphasized, it is fair to assume that the drive (and competition) to attend a top-ranking 
university increases (Dill 2006).32 
                                                          
31 Among these include the famous “QS World University Rankings”, “Times Higher Education World 
University Rankings”, and “U.S. News & World Report's Best Global Universities Rankings” 
32 Take Japan as an example.  Kono (1986) cites a national sample conducted by the Office of the Prime 
Minister of Japan in 1985 in which over 80 percent of respondents aged 20 and over felt that the stature of 
the universities from which they graduated impacted their position on the social hierarchy and their 
professional mobility. 
 
 
88 
Thus, in contexts where socioeconomic and institutional inequalities make the 
returns to higher education and a “prestigious” degree greater, one should expect higher 
overall competition.  In turn, this competition drives parents to take greater competitive-
seeking measures – like providing costly shadow education – to give their offspring a 
comparative advantage. 
5. Rapid Economic Development 
Well before shadow education became widespread throughout the world, Dore 
(1976, p. 11) hypothesized that “the later development starts...the more widely education 
certificates are used for occupational selection, the faster the rate of qualification 
inflation, and the more examination-oriented schooling becomes at the expense of 
genuine education.”  Dore contended that newly developed (and developing) countries 
were subject to a “diploma disease” because of large income differentials, greater scarcity 
of wage/salary jobs, and lacking resources necessary for styles of education that combat 
rote-memorizing and exam-centered ritualism (Dore 2012).  When many people are able 
to perform the same job, Dore argued, and there is little to choose between them, the use 
of academic qualifications as a screening mechanism makes the selection process more 
legitimate and transparent (Walford 1998).  Dore explains that this process results from 
qualification inflation (or a “steady fall in the job-getting value of any particular 
qualification) and qualification escalation (or a “steady rise in the qualification required 
for entry into a particular job”) (Dore 1976).  
Along similar lines, Kohler and I argue that stark intergenerational differences in 
wealth and opportunities, which are byproducts of rapid development, have exacerbated 
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the cultural pressure for parents to provide costly education for their children in many 
developing and recently developed countries (Anderson and Kohler 2013).  In these 
societies, the “grandparent generation” (or “pre-development generation”) was raised in 
impoverished conditions lacking opportunity and social mobility.  Their children, the 
“parent generation” (or “sandwich generation”) was born into a world of social and 
economic transition in which the value of education became overtly important for success 
in a country with many more people than well-paid jobs. And their children, who we 
refer to as the “post-development generation,” which is comprised of today’s children 
and teenagers, have inherited their parent’s education fever mentality.  This tri-
generational experience of differences in material wealth and social mobility is most 
apparent in East Asian countries – especially the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan) and China.  While Eastern Europe does not necessary fall into 
this categorization due to its unique experience with state-run economics, the early 90’s 
economic transition in the region led to greater prospects of social mobility, which in turn 
fueled the “rapidly-spreading” phenomenon of private tutoring (Silova 2010). 
6. High Stakes Exams 
National entrance examinations serve as a primary factor of college admissions in 
many countries worldwide, and reforms of these examinations and their increasing 
importance for getting into competitive universities have served as a driving force behind 
high rates of shadow education (Silova 2009; Bray and Lykins 2012). The Maturita 
(Slovakia), Matura (Poland), Gaokao (China), Suneung (Korea), Prueba de Selección 
Universitaria (Chile), Panellinies (Greece), and Vestibular (Brazil), for example, are not 
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only needed to finish high school, but are also used to determine the course of one’s 
higher education pursuits.  Dabillis (2014) calls the Greek Panellinies the “single 
event that defines a Greek student’s success – or failure – in the Greek 
educational system,” and points out that “highest scoring students get first crack at the 
most desired majors, such as law and medicine” while low scoring students may not even 
get a chance to study. (In 2014, the country had 70,305 public university spots for over 
100,000 students taking the entrance examination).  Tutors, who are often professors and 
teachers, have vested interests in maintaining high-stakes examinations, and for 
encouraging participation in shadow education (Popa and Acedo 2006, p. 104; Bray 
2011).   
7. Cohort Size Fluctuation 
Demographic forces may also explain heterogeneity in shadow education rates. 
Takayasu (2003), for example, argues that education fever in Japan has “cooled down” in 
the 21st century due to long periods of below-replacement fertility.  In contrast to its East 
Asian counterparts of Korea, Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, and Singapore, where fertility 
fell much more recently and precipitously, Japan has had below-replacement fertility 
since 1974.  This has invariably led to smaller birth cohorts and reduced competition for 
university spots and labor market positions.  The converse of this line of theoretical 
reasoning is that growing (or large) cohorts fuel competition for limited university places 
and scarce high-paying jobs, assuming a fixed number of positions (see Easterlin 1978). 
8.  Longstanding Youth Unemployment and High “Educated Unemployment” 
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The prevalence of shadow education in Southern Europe has been impressive 
over the last two decades, though rates still vary widely within the region (see Table 3.2).  
Reasons for private tutoring mirror those of East Asia and Eastern Europe; increased 
competition for university spots and a lack of parental confidence in public institutions 
have led to greater pressure on parents to invest more of their personal income in their 
children’s education (Katsillis and Rubinson 1990; Andreou 2012).  Southern Europe 
also stands out for having relatively high youth unemployment rates – a trend prevalent 
even before the so-called Great Recession (Kohler et al. 2002).  This poor economic 
climate – especially for young people – has increased the financial return on higher 
education and has exacerbated the need to provide one’s children with a competitive 
advantage (see Psacharopoulos 2009).33 
The aforementioned points have reasoned why high rates of shadow education 
exist across many parts of the world, though they do not address why the phenomenon of 
shadow education is much less pervasive in Western countries.  It is worth noting that 
Western Europe’s small scale of shadow education has only recently increased as a result 
of increased competitiveness and the marketization of education (Bray 2011), though 
rates still lie well below those of their Eastern and Southern European counterparts. 
Strong and equitable educational systems coupled with diversified economic 
opportunities for young people and a broad array of higher educational opportunities 
                                                          
33 Though high competition for university spots and jobs are cited as reasons for the necessity of shadow 
education in Southern and Eastern Europe, some countries do not fit this pattern.  For example, Sweden, 
France, and Belgium have relatively high youth unemployment but relatively low rates of shadow education, 
while Japan and Korea have low youth unemployment but high rates of private tutoring.  For an explanation 
of these outliers, see Bray (2011) and Anderson and Kohler (2013). 
 
 
92 
foster an environment in which private tutoring is not a necessity.  Especially in Northern 
Europe, low-achieving students receive additional tutoring through the framework of the 
public school system (as opposed to a “parallel system”).  Furthermore, high-stakes 
exams are non-existent in Scandinavian countries, which Bray (2011, p. 36) asserts is “no 
coincidence” that these countries also exhibit low levels of private supplementary 
tutoring. 
Quality-Quantity Tradeoff 
During periods of economic development, a growing demand for skilled workers 
to handle new technologies increases the demand for education (Perrin 2012).  Parents 
often react to these changes by having fewer children in efforts to concentrate their 
resources and to provide more and higher-quality education for their children.  The 
tradeoff between child “quantity” and child “quality” is a simple and straightforward way 
to understand the dynamics between human capital accumulation and fertility (Becker 
and Lewis 1974).  Simply referred to as the “quality-quantity tradeoff”, this theory has 
become an integral part of unified growth models with applicability across temporal and 
spatial contexts (see Galor and Weil 1999; Galor and Moav 2002; Doepke 2004; and 
Cervelatti and Sunde 2005). 
The quality-quantity tradeoff theory has been examined and supported from an 
historical perspective in a number of empirical papers. Becker et al. (2010) exploit unique 
census based data from 19th century Prussia and present evidence of a quality-quantity 
tradeoff.  Perrin (2012) tests the existence of the quality-quantity tradeoff for 19th century 
France, and finds a significant negative correlation linking number of children and female 
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investments in human capital.  Similarly, using parish data from England in the 18-19th 
century, Klemp and Weisdorf (2011) document a negative effect of family size on 
literacy.  Exploring the relationship between fertility and educational outcomes in early 
20th century Ireland, Fernihough (2011) finds that negative impact between sibship size 
and school enrollment, and notes that this relationship is stronger in more industrialized 
areas.  Despite differences in data and methods, these studies collectively make a 
compelling case that the quality-quantity tradeoff was indeed present in historical Europe. 
Empirical analyses on the quality-quantity tradeoff in the late 20th and early 21st 
century also suggest that family limitation is closely tied with better offspring outcomes 
in several contexts.  For example, Basu and Desei (2012) document the rise of single 
child families in India and find that single-child parents 1) are voluntarily having only 
one child; 2) compared to parents of larger families, single-child parents do not consume 
more, work more, or enjoy greater leisure time, but rather, they invest more in their 
offspring’s education; and 3) competition is driving parents to send their children to 
private schools and supplement their education with additional lessons.  They label this 
phenomenon “India’s Middle Class Dream”.  Thornton (1979) finds that US parents 
under the age of 40 in 1975 who have high aspirations for child quality (e.g., education, 
extracurricular activities, and maternal input) have much lower achieved and intended 
fertility than parents with low child quality aspirations.   And using exogenous variation 
of fertility brought about by multiple births (i.e., twins) as an instrumental variable, Liu 
(2014) and Li et al. (2008) demonstrate that in China, the number of children has 
significant negative effects on child height and educational outcomes, respectively.  
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Despite the two large bodies of literature on shadow education and the quality-
quantity tradeoff, no paper to date has argued that the sweeping phenomenon of shadow 
education serves as a global driving force of low fertility in the 21st century.  My 
hypothesis, consistent with Becker (1960), is as follows: as competition increases for 
university admissions and high-paying jobs, the steps taken by parents to ensure offspring 
success become more necessary, more rigorous, and more expensive.  Equipping one’s 
offspring with the educational opportunities to succeed through costly private tutoring (or 
“shadow education”) has become increasingly commonplace around the globe. The high 
costs of raising children have led parents to increasingly turn to single or two-child 
families. This relationship should theoretically be observed when looking at 
heterogeneity in fertility rates both across and within countries: ceteris paribus, countries 
with higher shadow education rates should have lower fertility than countries with low 
participation in shadow education, and within countries, parents who have higher human 
capital input costs for their offspring should have fewer children than parents with lower 
“quality-enhancing” expenditures.  For the latter analysis, I expect the association 
between shadow education expenditures and fertility to be smaller in magnitude in places 
where shadow education is less prevalent than in countries where it is widely practiced. 
3.3 Data and Methods 
 
For the following empirical analyses, I use the 2009 and 2012 waves of the 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), a cross-national survey of 15 
year old school pupils administered by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).  The primary focus of the PISA initiative is to provide cross-
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national comparisons of educational performance in three competence fields – reading, 
math, and science.  The secondary focus is to collect individual and household level 
economic and demographic data, in addition to participation in education-related events 
such as private tutoring.  For the purpose of this investigation, I use the second area of 
information.  Students chosen to participate in the survey receive a questionnaire and for 
a subset of countries, parents also complete a questionnaire.  Given that the questions 
asked vary somewhat between waves, I use the 2012 Student Survey for the macro-level 
analysis and the 2009 Parent Survey for the micro-level analyses. 
Macro-Level Analysis 
The macro-level analysis tests whether fertility is associated with shadow 
education rates in 42 low fertility countries (i.e., with TFR values under 2.1).34  Using the 
2012 wave of PISA, I calculate shadow education prevalence rates from the question 
asking students: “How many hours on average do you spend a week: Attend out of school 
classes organised by a commercial company, and paid for by your parents.”  Respondents 
who answered 1 or more hours were coded “1” (i.e., they participate in shadow 
education) and respondents who reported no hours were reported as “0” (i.e., they do not 
participate).  These prevalence rates are displayed in Table 3.2.  It should be kept it mind 
that these are simply estimations of shadow education rates among 15 year olds, and that 
rates likely vary by age and school year in different countries.  For example, a 1997 
survey in Seoul (Korea) found that elementary school children were much more likely to 
receive private tutoring than academic high school students (82% versus 59%), while a 
                                                          
34 These countries appear with an asterisk in Table 3.2.   
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1993 survey in Japan found the opposite (24% of elementary school pupils versus 60% of 
secondary school students) (Japan 1995; Paik 1998). Furthermore, these numbers capture 
only the prevalence of students who use outside paid commercial services (in some 
countries colloquially known as “test prep services” and in others, known as “cram 
schools”).  They do not capture private tutoring lessons given to students by independent 
one-on-one tutors.  Because the practice of private one-on-one tutoring may be more 
prevalent in some countries than others, this imprecision is a source of bias in the 
analysis. 
If shadow education prevalence rates proxy for a quality-quantity tradeoff, and if 
the PISA respondents are 15 years old at the time of the survey, then one must look at 
country-level fertility measures 15 years before the survey was given, as this would be 
the time when fertility decision making occurred.  Thus, the outcome variable included in 
the analysis is period TFR from 1997.  Moreover, because of the well-documented 
country-level associations between fertility and health, wealth, and education, the UN’s 
Human Development Index, which is a composite score of life expectancy (health), GDP 
per capita (wealth), and literacy rates/school attendance (education), is used as a 
moderator variable. 
The analysis is run using OLS regression with an interaction term between 
shadow education rates and HDI under the presumption that shadow education rates 
could influence fertility differentially at various development levels.  After running the 
regression, I compute the slopes of shadow education rates on TFRs while holding the 
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value of the moderator variable, HDI, constant at values running from .75-.95 at .025 
intervals.  The slopes are displayed in Table 3.3 and plotted in Figure 3.2. 
Micro-Level Analysis 
Using the 2009 parent survey, I employ OLS regression to explore whether 
fertility differentials exist by educational expenditures in 12 countries.  Being the only 
global survey that includes measures of household level private educational expenditures, 
family income, parental education, and family size, PISA provides the unique opportunity 
to examine the relationship between private educational expenditures and fertility, 
controlling for two important possible confounders: parental education and family 
income.  The countries for which all of these data are available can be geographically 
clustered into the following groups: Western (Denmark, Germany, and New Zealand), 
East Asian (Hong Kong, Macau, and Korea), Southern & Eastern European (Portugal, 
Hungary, and Lithuania), Latin American (Chile and Panama), and Middle Eastern 
(Qatar). 
The key independent variable (educational expenditures) asks parents: 
“Please answer the following question thinking just of expenses related to 
<the student who brought this questionnaire home>.  In the last twelve 
months, about how much would you have paid to educational providers 
for services?” 
Nothing 1 
<More than $0 but less than $W> 2 
<$W or more but less than $X> 3 
<$X or more but less than $Y> 4 
<$Y or more but less than $Z> 5 
<$Z> or more 6 
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The reference category for the analysis is “none”, meaning that the regression is 
essentially comparing parents who spend nothing on shadow education to parents who 
spend low, medium-low, medium, high, and very high amounts.  As a robustness check, I 
perform the same analysis using a “medium low” as the reference category for 
educational expenditures (see Appendix I).  
 It is important to note that each country has specific categorical ranges that differ 
based on average purchasing power and income for each country.  Moreover, the 
categories are reported in local currency. Table 3.1 displays the categorical distributions 
for categories for Denmark, Chile, Portugal, and Qatar to highlight these differences.  
Table 3.1: Educational Expenditures Categories in Select Countries 
 
Denmark (DKK) Chile (PESO) Portugal (EURO) Qatar (QT) 
None None None None 
1-500 0-3500 0-75 500-1000 
501-1000 3500-35500 75-3999 1000-6000 
1001-5000 35500-67500 4000-7999 6000-11000 
5001-20000 67500-100000 8000-11999 11000-16000 
20000+ 100000+ 12000+ 16000+ 
Source: PISA 2009 
The “family income” variable resembles the private educational expenditure 
variable in that there are six categorical ranges for income specific to each country.  The 
top-coding on the very highest income earners and private education spenders should be 
considered a source of bias when interpreting the results.  The second control variable, 
parental education, is measured as the highest attained educational level by either of the 
student’s parents. 
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As with the macro-level analysis, the micro-level analysis requires us to consider 
the timing of fertility making decisions.  Specifically, it is important to know the extent to 
which shadow education was practiced when the 2009 parent respondents made their 
fertility decisions (in 1994).  If participation in shadow education were high in the mid-
1990s, it would mean that the parents in the 2009 PISA survey had their children in a 
context of high competition and faced an anticipated costly upbringing. Conversely, if 
participation in shadow education in the mid-1990s were low, the argument that parents 
faced with a strong “quality-quantity tradeoff” would be less compelling. 
The Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), collected in 
1994-1995, provides a rare cross-national snapshot of private tutoring prevalence in a 
relatively large set of economically diverse nations (Baker et al. 2001).  Baker et al.’s 
analysis of the TIMSS supports the claim that shadow education was widespread in many 
countries in the mid-1990s: they find that the percentage of middle school respondents 
receiving shadow education in mathematics alone was 58% in Hong Kong, 50% in 
Hungary, 48% in Korea, 43% in Lithuania, 20% in New Zealand, 17% in Germany, and 
8% in Denmark (Baker et al. 2001).  While data for Qatar, Chile, Panama, and Macau are 
not available in the TIMSS, others have documented that costly educational expenses, in 
some form or another, were prevalent in Chile and Macau in the mid-1990s. For example, 
citing UNESCO statistics, Wolff and Castro (2001) report that Chile had the highest 
percentage of primary and secondary students enrolled in private high schools in South 
America (nearly 42% and 45%, respectively).  Li and Choi (2014) reflect on Macau’s 
longstanding history with high participation in private tutoring.  Given the paucity of 
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scholarly accounts/data on private tutoring prevalence in the mid-1990s in Qatar and 
Panama, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of the burden imposed on parents by 
educational expenditures.  Nonetheless, the relatively high shadow education rates 
documented in the TIMSS in Kuwait (25%) and Colombia (85%) – Qatar and Panama’s 
geographically, culturally, and economically similar neighbors, respectively – may serve 
as some rough indication that shadow education rates were probably not insignificant in 
Qatar and Panama (Baker et al. 2011). 
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Figure 3.1: Shadow Education Rates Among 15 Year Olds in Select Countries in Wave 4 PISA Countries35 
 
Table 3.2: Shadow Education Rates Among 15 Year Olds in All Wave 4 PISA Countries 
Percent of Students Aged 15 in Shadow Education 
Norway* 3% Switzerland* 12% Serbia* 22% Spain* 40% 
Finland* 6% Italy* 13% Poland* 24% Qatar 41% 
Liechtenstein 6% Croatia* 14% Israel 26% Jordan 41% 
Sweden* 7% Portugal* 14% Tapei 28% Bulgaria* 42% 
Denmark* 7% Chile 14% Germany* 29% Columbia 43% 
Netherlands* 7% Czech Republic* 14% Costa Rica 29% Brazil 45% 
Belgium* 7% Luxemburg* 15% Singapore* 30% Tunisia 46% 
Iceland* 7% Ireland* 16% Montenegro* 30% Shanghai 47% 
France* 8% Japan* 18% Uruguay 31% Korea* 47% 
Canada* 9% Slovakia* 18% Hong Kong* 31% Thailand* 49% 
Australia* 9% Slovenia* 18% Peru 33% Albania 50% 
Austria* 10% Romania* 18% Latvia* 35% Greece* 53% 
USA* 10% Lithuania* 18% Turkey 37% Kazakhstan* 54% 
Great Britain* 11% Macau 19% Argentina 39% Malaysia 71% 
Hungary* 11% Estonia* 20% UAE 39% Vietnam 76% 
New Zealand* 12% Mexico 21% Russia* 40% Indonesia 78% 
                               Source: Author’s calculated estimates from PISA 2012.   
                               Note: Countries with asterisks had below-replacement fertility in 1997 and are included in macro-level fertility analysis.   
                                                          
35 Note: Iceland, Croatia, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Norway, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Montenegro, Taipei, and Luxemburg were dropped from 
Figure 3.1 but can be found in Table 3.2. 
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3.4 Results 
 
 The margins plot below (Figure 3.2) illustrates the relationship between country-
level shadow education rates (2012) and TFRs (1997) in low fertility countries, while 
holding constant HDI (1997) at different values.  It reveals that the slopes for fertility on 
shadow education prevalence are significant for all values of HDI at or above .80 (see 
Table 3.3).  The divide between moderately high fertility countries and very low fertility 
countries within the frame of shadow education is stark: Norway, Finland, Australia, 
Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Iceland, and France all had shadow education 
rates under 10% in 2012 and TFRs around 1.7-2 in 1997; Greece, Russia, Spain, Taipei 
(Taiwan), Germany, Singapore, and Hong Kong all had shadow education rates between 
29%-53% in 2012 and TFRs at or below the “lowest-low” fertility mark of 1.3 in 1997.  
One should consider that many other co-occurring trends and similarities (especially with 
regard to family structures, gender norms, and institutional policies) are clustered within 
these two groups of relatively high and relatively low fertility countries, limiting causal 
inference.  Nonetheless, these results suggest that the quality-quantity tradeoff may serve 
as one force driving heterogeneity in fertility rates among the most developed countries. 
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Table 3.3: Slopes of Shadow Education Rates (2012) on Fertility (1997) 
Slope of Fertility on 
Shadow HDI SE P-Value 95% Confidence Interval 
0.11 0.750 0.34 0.74 -0.58 0.80 
-0.25 0.775 0.33 0.46 -0.92 0.43 
-0.61 0.800 0.35 0.09 -1.31 0.10 
-0.96 0.825 0.39 0.02 -1.75 -0.18 
-1.32 0.850 0.44 0.01 -2.22 -0.43 
-1.68 0.875 0.51 0.00 -2.71 -0.65 
-2.04 0.900 0.58 0.00 -3.22 -0.86 
-2.40 0.925 0.66 0.00 -3.74 -1.06 
-2.76 0.950 0.74 0.00 -4.26 -1.26 
 
Figure 3.2: Slopes of Shadow on Fertility at Different HDI Levels 
 
    Source: PISA 2012 
 
The results from the micro-level (within-country) analyses lend support to the 
hypothesized quality-quantity tradeoff. As Figure 3.3 and Table 3.4 suggest, looking 
cross-nationally, the significance and magnitude of the coefficients of the analyses vary 
from country to country; however, in most countries (Chile, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Korea, Lithuania, Panama, Portugal, and Qatar), there appear to be gradients in the 
expenditure-fertility relationship, such that greater levels of private educational 
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expenditures are associated with lower levels of completed fertility.  While not all of the 
differences between the educational expenditure levels and fertility are significant (e.g., 
in Panama and Korea, only one expenditure group displays statistically significant 
fertility compared to the reference category), the overall patterns of these eight countries 
present a compelling case that those who spend money on their offspring’s shadow 
education typically have fewer children than those who spend nothing.  
The four countries that did not follow the “quality-quantity” pattern can be 
clustered into two groups. Germany and New Zealand revealed no statistically significant 
differences between parents who spend nothing on their children’s private education and 
parents who spend low, medium, or high amounts.  Denmark and Macau – two widely 
different countries on a multitude of dimensions – on the other hand, reveal similarly 
unique patterns: comparing parents of similar educational and income levels, those 
spending very high amounts on private education in fact have more children than parents 
who spend nothing.  As mentioned, because “educational expenditures” and “family 
income” are categorical variables that have been top-coded (e.g., “$10,000 or more), it is 
impossible to know the income of “high earners” and the educational expenditures of the 
“high spenders.”  This bias may serve as one possible explanation for why Denmark and 
Macau stand out as outliers in the analysis.  Perhaps those who belong to the highest 
category of spenders are so rich that they have more children.  The top-coding of these 
variables may also explain why we see breaks to the fertility-expenditure gradients in 
Chile, Hong Kong, Korea, Portugal, and Qatar in the highest spending category (see 
Figure 3.3). 
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Using a different reference category confirms that the results are robust: as seen in 
Table 3.4 (Appendix I), in the eight quality-quantity tradeoff countries highlighted, 
compared to parents who spend “medium-low” amounts on their children, parents who 
have higher shadow education expenditures typically have fewer children and parents 
who spend less on shadow education typically have more children. As with the original 
analysis, Germany and New Zealand showed no differences in fertility, and Denmark and 
Macau displayed a somewhat idiosyncratic pattern. 
Figure 3.3: Fertility gradients by educational expenditure category (reference: No private 
tutoring expenses; for full output, see Table 3.4) 
Source: PISA 2009 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 3.4: Full Output of Micro-level Analysis For 12 Countries  (Coefficients and Standard Errors in Parenthesis) 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
 Chile Germany Denmark Hong Kong Hungary Korea Lithuania Macau 
New 
Zealand Panama Portugal Qatar 
Edu. Expenses (Ref.=Nothing) 
Low -0.08 -0.05 0.16* -0.19** -0.22*** -0.04 -0.08* -0.03 -0.26 0.03 -0.11 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.16) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) 
Medium Low -0.26*** 0.03 0.18 -0.32*** -0.23*** -0.08 -0.09 0.01 -0.26 0.16 -0.22* 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.16) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) 
Medium -0.33*** -0.02 -0.08 -0.46*** -0.31*** -0.12 -0.15* 0 -0.14 -0.05 -0.22* 0.37*** 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) 
High -0.33** -0.03 0.06 -0.46*** -0.34*** -0.13* 0.04 0.1 -0.05 -0.12 -0.28 0.49*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) (0.19) (0.10) (0.16) (0.11) 
Very High -0.09 -0.04 0.28*** -0.25* -0.38*** -0.11 -0.51*** 0.29*** -0.12 -0.20* -0.1 0.44*** 
 (0.09) (0.17) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.14) (0.08) (0.18) (0.10) (0.27) (0.10) 
Income (Ref.=Very Low) 
Low 0.09 0.21* -0.27* 0 0.14** 0.02 -0.09 0.02 0.08 -0.35*** -0.08* -0.11 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) 
Medium Low 0.01 0.05 -0.34** 0.01 0.20*** 0.04 -0.11* -0.06 0.07 -0.41*** -0.12** 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.11) (0.04) (0.08) 
Medium 0.1 0.07 -0.11 0.05 0.28*** 0.01 -0.13** -0.05 0.11 -0.45*** -0.13** 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.12) (0.05) (0.09) 
High 0.01 0.03 -0.19 -0.09 0.20* 0.04 -0.06 0 0.01 -0.28* -0.08 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.09) 
Very High 0.12 0.11 -0.11 0 0.37*** 0.08* 0.04 0.11* 0.08 -0.43*** -0.10* -0.09 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.12) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) 
Parental Education (Ref.=Basic)             
Some HS -0.08 -0.14 0.03 0.04 -0.33*** -0.17** -0.52 -0.09*** -0.02 -0.55*** -0.13*** -0.17 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.37) (0.03) (0.11) (0.11) (0.03) (0.10) 
High school -0.09 -0.30*** -0.06 -0.20*** -0.39*** . -0.62 -0.27*** -0.09 -0.39** -0.12** -0.17 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) . (0.37) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) (0.04) (0.09) 
Some college -0.07 -0.38*** -0.08 -0.18** -0.44*** -0.14* -0.83* -0.19*** -0.06 -0.46*** -0.09 -0.62*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.37) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) 
College or more -0.12 -0.27*** 0.07 -0.16** -0.35*** 0.23*** -0.81* -0.34*** -0.13 -0.63*** 0.02 -0.87*** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.37) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) 
Constant 2.54*** 2.36*** 2.27*** 2.49*** 2.53*** 2.42*** 2.89*** 2.29*** 2.71*** 3.48*** 2.33*** 4.84*** 
  (0.06) (0.09) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.36) (0.05) (0.17) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
N 4954 2238 3233 3910 3596 4806 3781 5517 3070 2622 4142 5266 
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3.5 Discussion 
 
The quality-quantity tradeoff theory describes the process whereby parents 
consciously have fewer children in order to increase “child quality” through resource 
concentration. In an era of fierce competition in education, I argue that the costly 
educational expenditures now pervasive in many countries around the world create a 21st 
century quality-quantity tradeoff.  I hypothesize that a stronger quality-quantity tradeoff 
exists in countries where competition for university spots and top jobs causes parents to 
invest heavily in their children, and that countries in which shadow education is more 
pervasive have lower TFRs than countries with low levels of participation in shadow 
education. 
To operationalize these hypotheses, I first look at the relationship between 
shadow education and fertility across countries.  This analysis demonstrates that across 
low-fertility countries, country-level shadow education rates correlate strongly with TFRs 
and can explain about 34% of variation in country-level fertility. 
I then test the quality-quantity tradeoff within 12 economically, geographically, 
and culturally diverse countries using individual level data.  I use an educational 
expenditure variable to proxy for “intended child quality,” as parents who spend more on 
their children are presumably doing so in order to boost educational success of that child.  
My analyses compare the fertility between parents who do not spend anything on 
additional “shadow education” for their child (the student respondent) with parents who 
spend various categorical amounts on additional private education.  An intuitive concern 
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with this approach is whether variables like socioeconomic status of the parents influence 
educational expenditures.  To account for this source of possible endogeneity, I control 
for parental education and family income.  Moreover, because the analyses were 
conducted separately by country, country-level variables, such as national educational 
standards, average governmental expenditures on schooling, and other institutional, 
cultural, and economic factors that could influence or attenuate the relationship between 
fertility and private educational expenditures are, by nature, held constant.  The results 
yield statistically significant fertility-expenditure gradients can be found in 8 out of the 
12 countries analyzed, suggesting a “quality-quantity” tradeoff within these countries. 
The central findings of this paper are threefold: First, a review of a wide body of 
literature suggests that the drivers of shadow education are multifaceted.  From poor 
school quality to social and institutional inequalities to high-stakes exams, there is no 
“magic explanation” as to why shadow education prevalence is high in some countries 
and low in others.  Second, the percentage of 15-year-old students receiving private 
tutoring around the world spans a vast range, from 3% in Norway to 78% in Indonesia.  
These estimations confirm a growing body of literature on the ubiquity of shadow 
education in high, medium, and low-income countries.  And third, taken together, the 
across and within population analyses lend credence to notion that the rising phenomenon 
of shadow education is a strong predictor of fertility. 
While this paper offers insight into an unexplored niche in the low fertility 
literature, several limitations should be noted to 1) highlight the shortcomings of the 
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analyses and 2) preemptively inform future empirical studies examining the quality-
quantity tradeoff with relation to shadow education. 
With regard to the macro-level analysis, one key limitation is that the shadow 
education participation rates estimated in this paper only reflect the percentage of 15 year 
olds receiving private tutoring.  As I have pointed out, the use of shadow education can 
vary significantly by age and grade.  
 Moreover, the shadow education participation rate I calculate is a crude measure 
of prevalence that fails to capture the intensity of private tutoring.  If we imagine a 
country in which all students receive one hour of private tutoring a week, and another 
country in which ½ of the students receive ten hours of weekly private tutoring, we 
would be correct in saying that country A has higher prevalence, while country B has 
higher intensity.  A reasonable hypothesis within the quality-quantity framework is that 
both the intensity and prevalence of shadow education play into the equation. Future 
analyses that incorporate both of these dimensions would be helpful in providing a more 
nuanced evaluation on the macro-level relationship between fertility and shadow 
education. 
A last noteworthy limitation in the macro-level analysis is the use of the period 
TFR as the outcome variable.  While the period TFR continues to be the most commonly 
used measure in cross-national fertility studies, it suffers from tempo-distortions caused 
by childbearing postponement.  Because different countries found themselves at different 
stages in the “postponement transition” in 1997 (the outcome variable year), some 
countries’ fertility levels necessarily were biased downwards more than others.  Sweden 
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serves as a prime example of this distortive phenomenon: the TFR of Sweden in 1997 
was 1.52, while completed cohort fertility for Swedish women born 1950-1975 never 
dropped below 1.9. 
The micro-level analyses also feature several limitations.  First, top-coding on the 
family income and educational expenditure variables presents a problem with the 
estimation of the fertility-expenditure relationship among the highest spenders and 
highest earners.  Another limitation is that the PISA data do not include a number of 
control variables that may attenuate the relationship between shadow education and 
fertility, such as within-country region (e.g., urban vs. rural) and age of siblings (i.e., 
birth order).  Lastly, there is a possibility of further childbearing among parental 
respondents, though this is unlikely, as 15 year gaps in childbearing are rare. 
An overarching limitation to both the macro- and micro-level analyses is the 
question of causality.  Given the cross-sectional methodological approach and limitations 
of the data, the findings in this paper do not warrant causal interpretation. Whether 
couples reduce their fertility in order to have higher quality offspring, or couples with 
fewer children (for reasons unrelated to human capital aspirations of their offspring) have 
more resources to spend on their children’s education is impossible to bear out of any sort 
of data without explicit questioning about the reason for family size limitation.  Future 
researchers addressing this topic would benefit from more explicit questioning regarding 
fertility aspirations, the reasons for limiting fertility, and the perceived impact of costly 
educational expenditures on fertility decision-making. 
 
 
 
111 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Similar to Chapter 1, the driver of low fertility discussed in this Chapter – a strong 
quality-quantity tradeoff – is also closely tied to rapid economic development and also is 
part of a homeostatic feedback mechanism.  Weak educational institutions coupled with 
large school-age cohorts competing for limited elite academic spots and well-paying 
labor market positions, lingering economic uncertainty, generational differences in 
wealth, large inequalities, and often times, high-stakes exams, foster a culture of 
“education fever.”  The result is, as I argue in this Chapter, that parents are more likely to 
reduce their fertility in order to produce successful, well-educated offspring.  However, 
similar to Chapter 1, as persistent low-fertility generates smaller birth cohorts, 
competition invariably reduces and so too does the quality-quantity tradeoff.   
The above claim not only makes theoretical sense but also can be witnessed from 
an historical perspective and seems to hold empirically for the world in which we live.  
There is likely no better case study exemplifying this phenomenon than Japan, a country 
that can be characterized as having developed rapidly much earlier than its East Asian 
counterparts (Anderson and Kohler 2013).  Takasuya (2003, p. 205) explains that the 
number of 18-year olds declined from 2.05 million in 1992 to 1.5 million in 2002, 
resulting in “considerably less intense” competition to get into university in the country.  
While obtaining a spot at an elite university will persist for Japan’s foreseeable future, 
declining cohort sizes will invariably translate into an easing of competition – especially 
among less prestigious institutions (Takasuya 2003). 
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 A look at past, current, and projected cohort sizes of 18 year olds in selected low-
fertility countries in Table 3.5 illustrates how rapid demographic shifts resulting from low 
fertility can manifest within just 60 years.  Between 1990 and 2050, cohorts of 18 year 
olds will have fallen by nearly half in Greece, Russia, and Japan, and by almost a two-
thirds in Korea. 
Table 3.5: Cohort Sizes in Select Countries over Time 
 
 Number of 18 year olds in 1990, 2010, 2030, and 2050 
Year Japan Korea Russia Greece 
1990  2,014,572   908,078   2,003,477   167,261  
2010  1,226,359   695,687   1,730,310   105,382  
2030  1,074,437   411,509   1,771,097   99,746  
2050  834,137   337,269   1,248,826   89,272  
       Source: US Census Bureau  
While shrinking country-level cohort sizes may not affect the competition for 
internationally competitive jobs, they will likely impact the competition in local 
economies, and perhaps more importantly, the competition within local educational 
systems.  In turn, one would expect the perceived costs of child input to reduce, and that 
this in turn would cause fertility to increase. 
The ubiquity of shadow education and greater competition in education and the 
labor market create an environment in which large financial pressures are perceived to be 
needed to ensure “child quality”.  Should these pressures persist or intensify, one may 
expect that the quality-quantity tradeoff will become an increasingly important driver of 
low fertility in the 21st century.  Conversely, as low fertility persists across geographical 
and economic contexts, one may expect an easing of competition through declining 
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cohort sizes.  This paper calls on future researchers to develop surveys and 
methodological approaches to explicitly assess the extent to which desired child quality 
influences fertility, and the extent to which low fertility influences the quality-quantity 
tradeoff. 
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3.6 Appendix 1: Additional Output. Table 3.6: Micro-level analysis with different ref. category for educ. expenditures 
 Chile Germany Denmark Hong Kong Hungary Korea Lithuania Macau 
New 
Zealand Panama Portugal Qatar 
Educational Expenditures 
(Ref.=Medium Low) None 0.26*** -0.03 -0.18 0.32*** 0.23*** -0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.26 -0.16 0.22* -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.16) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) 
Low 0.18*** -0.08 -0.03 0.13** 0.01 -0.08 0.01 -0.03 0 -0.13 0.11* 0 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06) 
Medium -0.07 -0.05 -0.26* -0.15*** -0.08 -0.12 -0.06 -0.01 0.13 -0.21 0 -
0.40**
* 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.13) (0.06) (0.07) 
High -0.08 -0.06 -0.12 -0.14* -0.12* -0.13* 0.13 0.09 0.21 -0.28* -0.06 -
0.52**
* 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) 
Very High 0.17* -0.07 0.1 0.06 -0.15 -0.11 -0.42** 0.29*** 0.14 -0.36** 0.11 -
0.47**
* 
 (0.07) (0.17) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.25) (0.08) 
Income (Ref.=Very Low) 
Low 0.09 0.21* -0.27* 0 0.14** 0.02 -0.09 0.02 0.08 -0.35*** -0.08* -0.11 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) 
Medium Low 0.01 0.05 -0.34** 0.01 0.20*** 0.04 -0.11* -0.06 0.07 -0.41*** -0.12** 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.11) (0.04) (0.08) 
Medium 0.1 0.07 -0.11 0.05 0.28*** 0.01 -0.13** -0.05 0.11 -0.45*** -0.13** 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.12) (0.05) (0.09) 
High 0.01 0.03 -0.19 -0.09 0.20* 0.04 -0.06 0 0.01 -0.28* -0.08 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.09) 
Very High 0.12 0.11 -0.11 0 0.37*** 0.08* 0.04 0.11* 0.08 -0.43*** -0.10* -0.09 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.12) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) 
Parental Education (Ref.=Basic) 
Education) 
            
Some HS -0.08 -0.14 0.03 0.04 -0.33*** -0.17** -0.52 -0.09*** -0.02 -0.55*** -0.13*** -0.17 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) -0.06 (0.37) (0.03) (0.11) (0.11) (0.03) (0.10) 
High school -0.09 -0.30*** -0.06 -0.20*** -0.39*** . -0.62 -0.27*** -0.09 -0.39** -0.12** -0.17 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) . (0.37) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) (0.04) (0.09) 
Some college -0.07 -0.38*** -0.08 -0.18** -0.44*** -0.14* -0.83* -0.19*** -0.06 -0.46*** -0.09 -
0.62**
* 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) -0.06 (0.37) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) 
College or more -0.12 -0.27*** 0.07 -0.16** -0.35*** -0.23*** -0.81* -0.34*** -0.13 -0.63*** 0.02 -
0.87**
* 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) -0.06 (0.37) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) 
Constant 2.28*** 2.40*** 2.46*** 2.17*** 2.30*** 2.42*** 2.80*** 2.30*** 2.45*** 3.64*** 2.11*** 4.87**
*   (0.05) (0.10) (0.15) (0.04) (0.06) -0.08 (0.37) (0.03) (0.09) (0.11) (0.03) (0.09) 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Conclusion 
4.1 Introduction 
  
The long-term social, economic, and political implications of low fertility are far 
reaching, affecting labor markets, the fiscal sustainability of social programs, marital and 
family relationships, demand for immigration, and a variety of population aging related 
issues (Pritchett and Viarengo 2013).  Given these consequences, considerable research 
attention has been given to the drivers of low fertility.  This dissertation adds to a large 
existing literature on the causes and consequences of low fertility within and across 
populations by exploring three dimensions of fertility in three chapters: Chapter 1) how 
are gender regimes related to low fertility, and how and why does this relationship 
change over time; Chapter 2) how do gender ideologies shape fertility differentials in the 
United States; and Chapter 3) is the widespread phenomenon of “shadow education” 
linked to macro or micro level fertility processes.  By doing so, this dissertation makes 
several overarching contributions to the literature. 
4.2 Contributions to the Literature 
 
Chapter 1 and the Chapter 3 of this dissertation dissect two drivers of global 
variation in low fertility countries: gender equity and shadow education.  Both chapters 
argue that the magnitude of these factors have macro-level effects on TFRs in developed 
countries, whereby low family-oriented gender equity and high participation in shadow 
education typically translate into low or lowest-low fertility (TFRs <1.5).  On the other 
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hand, countries with high levels of family-oriented gender equity and low participation in 
shadow education generally have relatively high fertility (TFRs between 1.7-2.1).  While 
these two chapters discuss the causes of low fertility in-length, they also touch on an 
important and novel contribution of this dissertation—that is, that the drivers of low 
fertility self-correct through a homeostatic feedback mechanism caused by low fertility. 
Chapter 1 argued that rapid economic development results in a strong work-
family conflict.  As a result of this work-family conflict, fertility falls and cohort sizes 
shrink.  Over time, declining birth cohorts translate into a favorable marriage market in 
which young women gain bargaining power in relationships, thereby weakening the 
work-family conflict and resulting in fertility increases.  We called this period the 
“gender-equity dividend”, and gave the examples of Sweden and the United States – two 
countries that experienced large shifts in gender norms and fertility throughout the 20th 
century.  
 Chapter 3 argued that parents reduce their fertility to increase educational 
expenditures and produce successful, well-educated offspring.  Similar to Chapter 1, the 
reduced fertility brought about by the “quality-quantity tradeoff” generates smaller birth 
cohorts, which invariably reduces competition and the quality-quantity tradeoff.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, a well-documented example of education fever “cool off” is 
Japan, where below-replacement fertility has persisted for forty years.  
Together, Chapters 1 and 3 demonstrate how low fertility (caused by a work-
family conflict and strong quality-quantity tradeoff) generates smaller birth cohorts that 
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weaken the work-family conflict and quality-quantity tradeoff, leading to fertility 
increases. The following flowchart illustrates the homeostatic feedback process by which 
low fertility corrects itself. 
Figure 4.1: Homeostatic Feedback Process Between Fertility and Gender 
Equity/Quality-Quantity Tradeoff 
  
 A second main contribution of this dissertation, and in particular, of Chapter 1, is 
that it draws on a long range of historical data and scholarly work to better understand the 
drivers of low fertility in the early 20th century.  As the chapter highlights, the remarkable 
similarities in fertility patterns between early and late 20th century should prompt scholars 
of family demography to consider the old adage, “history repeats itself.” 
This dissertation also contributes to a growing body of unresolved empirical 
literature on the relationship between gender equity and fertility at the micro-level 
(Chapter 2) by examining fertility differentials by gender ideology.  As the majority of 
existing literature on this topic has been conducted in Europe, Chapter 2 offers a fresh 
perspective in an understudied context (the United States) using rich longitudinal data.   
 A fourth noteworthy contribution of this dissertation is that it bridges together two 
separately discussed phenomena—low fertility and shadow education—within an 
existing, well-established framework pertaining to fertility, the quality-quantity tradeoff 
(Chapter 3).  The rapid international expansion of shadow education has fundamentally 
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changed the financial pressures faced by parents around the world with regards to their 
offspring’s education.  It would be imprudent for cross-national comparisons of low 
fertility – especially those involving non-Western countries – to write off the impact of 
the financial pressures brought about by shadow education as secondary in importance to 
other well-established predictors of fertility variation. 
4.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
 While the limitations to each of the analyses in this dissertation have been 
discussed in their respective chapters, there are several overarching limitations that 
should be highlighted. 
 First, as Chapters 1 and 2 demonstrate, there is a great need to resolve 
inconsistencies in empirical findings between the macro- and micro-level.  McDonald’s 
theory – that greater household gender equity translates into higher fertility – does not 
apply to the United States, where traditionally thinking men and women have much 
higher fertility than their progressive counterparts.36  Exploration into why these micro-
macro inconsistencies exist and developing theoretical models to account for them would 
serve as fruitful areas of future research. 
Furthermore, future research on low fertility may benefit from additional fertility-
related questions on global surveys.  While many cross-national surveys typically include 
measures on children ever born (e.g., the World Values Survey and the Programme for 
International Student Assessment), more detailed data on fertility-related measures would 
                                                          
36 That McDonald’s theory does not apply on the micro-level in the US is not surprising; after all, the 
framework is explicit in explaining country-level TFR variation.  
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give researchers a higher degree of methodological freedom to answer more complex 
questions.  Given the limited demographic data on the PISA, for example, the scope of 
complexity in the micro-level analyses in Chapter 3 was restricted.   Moreover, causal 
inferences in fertility research would be strengthened if surveys featured more explicit 
questioning about fertility intentions, childbearing motivations, and perceived hindrances 
to achieving ideal family size. 
 Finally, any broad theory involving bold predictions is necessarily limited by the 
uncertainty of future events.  With that said, future research should monitor the extent to 
which the predictions set forth in Chapter 1 play out.  Will gender regimes in Southern 
Europe and East Asia evolve as predicted?  Will today’s “second-wave developers” 
follow in the footsteps of “first-wave developers” and experience fertility increases?  And 
will today’s swiftly developing countries like China, India, and Brazil become the new 
poster children of lowest-low fertility in the years to come?  As scholars of low fertility 
debate the future of low fertility and its potentially advantageous or pernicious 
consequences, continual efforts to strengthen theoretical and empirical approaches will be 
crucial for understanding the complex dynamics of low fertility. 
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